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Executive Summary
The Salton Sea, a 350 square mile saltwater lake 
in southeastern California, faces disaster. In the 
next fifteen years:
	 The amount of water flowing into 
 the lake will decrease by about 40%;
	 Its surface will drop by twenty feet
 and its volume will decrease by more 
 than 60%; 
	 Salinity will triple; and
	 The shrinking lake will expose 100 square 
miles of dust–generating lake bottom to 
the region’s blowing winds, worsening the 
already poor air quality in the region.
To date, neither the state legislature nor any 
other agency has taken any action to fund any 
Salton Sea revitalization plan. In 2003, California 
accepted responsibility for funding air quality 
management projects at the Salton Sea, but the 
legislature has yet to take any action to fund 
such projects. A local agency is developing plans 
for air quality management on a portion of the 
exposed Salton Sea lakebed, but it lacks the 
funding necessary to implement these plans. With 
the exception of three relatively modest habitat 
projects scheduled for construction next year, no 
projects are currently funded or expected to be 
constructed at the Salton Sea in the near future. 
As a result, the lake’s habitat value for hundreds 
of species of resident and migratory birds will 
rapidly decline, affecting hundreds of thousands 
of birds and diminishing the lake’s appeal. 
If current trends continue, by 2045:
	 As much as 150 square miles of lakebed 
will be exposed; 
	 Exposed lakebed will add as much as 100 
tons of fine dust into the air per day; 
	 The total population of the air basin 
(currently about 650,000) will nearly 
double; 
	 The lake will be filled with algae, 
bacteria, and viruses, providing no 
 value to birds or people. 
The deteriorating conditions at the Salton Sea will 
have adverse impacts on public health, property 
values, agricultural production, recreational 
revenue, and the region’s habitat value for birds 
and wildlife generally. These impacts impose 
costs on people in the area and, to a lesser 
extent, on Californians generally. 
Many people assume that deferring Salton Sea–
related decisions and actions will not result 
in any additional costs, implicitly assigning 
these impacts a value of zero. Decision–makers 
have weighed the high costs of Salton Sea 
revitalization and the lower but still significant 
costs of mitigation against this assumed zero cost 
of not taking action, and have yet to approve or 
fund any major projects at the Salton Sea. This 
inaction and delay imposes real costs. 
objective
The objective of this report is to estimate the 
costs of inaction – defined as the absence of 
any large–scale revitalization or air quality 
management project – at the Salton Sea, to 
provide decision–makers and the general public 
with information for deciding on a path forward. 
Specifically, this report estimates the impacts of 
the deteriorating Salton Sea on:
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	 health care costs, due to the adverse 
impact that increased dust emissions have 
on human health;
	 regional property values, due to real and 
perceived health threats and declining 
aesthetic value; 
	 agricultural productivity, due to dust 
emissions and loss of the Sea’s buffering 
impacts on temperature and humidity in 
nearby farmland;
	 recreational revenues; and
	 ecological values, including impacts to 
threatened and endangered species.
The Costs of action
The California Natural Resources Agency 
estimated the capital cost for its 2007 preferred 
Salton Sea revitalization alternative at about $10 
billion (all costs adjusted to 2013 dollars), plus 
annual operations & maintenance costs of $150 
million once fully constructed, yielding a total 
present value of $9.6 billion at a 4% discount 
rate, through the year 2047. These projected 
revitalization costs are separate and distinct from 
the costs projected for mitigating (off–setting 
the impacts of) the Imperial Valley–San Diego 
water transfer. The present value of the state’s 
conceptual mitigation plan is about $1.7 billion 
through 2047. These values represent the costs of 
‘action’ at the Salton Sea. 
Inaction Costs – Public Health 
Many scientific and medical studies document the 
link between blowing dust and a broad range of 
public health impacts, including childhood and 
adult asthma, cardiac disease, lung cancer, and 
increased mortality rates. Two previous studies 
suggest methods to estimate the magnitude 
of these costs at the Salton Sea: based on the 
estimated per capita cost of exceeding federal 
air quality standards, or based on a cost per 
unit of exposed dust. Using the first method, 
the public health costs of continuing not to 
meet federal air quality standards – exacerbated 
by expected Salton Sea dust emissions and a 
rapidly growing population – generate a present 
value as high as $21 billion. Using the second 
method, under a worst case scenario, with high 
projected dust emissions and very limited air 
quality management, the present value cost of 
uncontrolled dust emissions on public health 
could be $37 billion through 2047. Assuming a 
much lower rate of emissions and implementation 
of dust control measures on portions of the 
exposed Salton Sea lakebed reduces the estimate 
of public health costs to about $3 billion. Annual 
public health costs increase as the Salton Sea 
shrinks, exposing more dust–emitting lakebed; 
but even in the near term, they could still exceed 
hundreds of millions of dollars per year. 
Inaction Costs – Property Value
Studies on the economic impacts of 
environmental hazards in other areas, such as 
landfills, confined animal feeding operations, 
and refineries, offer methods for estimating 
potential impacts to property values at the 
Salton Sea. Regional or state polling data on 
public perceptions of the Salton Sea would 
be informative, but no such polls have been 
conducted in at least a decade. Blowing dust 
and the stigma associated with a deteriorating 
lake pose a risk to property values within several 
miles of the lake, suggesting that property 
devaluation in the immediate area associated 
with the deteriorating Salton Sea is likely to be at 
least $400 million. Dust and noxious odors could 
also depress property values and revenues in the 
Coachella Valley more broadly, which includes 
124 golf courses as well as numerous resorts and 
vacation homes, so the total impact on property 
values could be as much as $7 billion.
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Inaction Costs – Agricultural Productivity
Insufficient information exists to estimate the 
potential costs associated with either the impacts 
of blowing dust and salt on crop productivity near 
the Salton Sea or the diminished micro–climate 
benefits that will occur as the lake shrinks. Both 
of these impacts will be felt within a few miles 
of the Salton Sea, so their overall cost may be 
small relative to the magnitude of Imperial and 
Coachella valley agriculture generally, but these 
impacts could be significant at the scale of the 
individual farm.
Inaction Costs – Recreational Revenues
The future Salton Sea will continue to experience 
declines in visitation to the lake and in direct 
recreation–related expenditures. Recent declines 
have caused a loss of $6 million per year in direct 
spending at the Salton Sea State Recreation Area 
relative to estimated historic rates, suggesting 
the loss of $110 – $150 million in present value 
through 2047. Given the absence of records or 
surveys of current and historic expenditures 
for Salton Sea recreation as a whole, this rough 
estimate should be considered very conservative. 
Inaction Costs – Ecological Values
The Salton Sea currently provides tens of 
thousands of acres of shoreline and near–shore 
habitats to hundreds of thousands of birds. More 
than 400 species of birds use the Salton Sea, 
including a large number of special status species. 
As the lake deteriorates, the size and quality of 
its habitats will diminish, reducing its value to the 
resident and migratory birds that depend upon it. 
Through contingent valuation surveys and other 
methods, people have expressed a willingness to 
pay to preserve similar values at other locations. 
Previous studies have indicated that Californians 
as a whole have valued wetland habitats at 
about $60,000 per acre, suggesting that the 
Salton Sea provided some $2.6 billion annually 
in shoreline habitat value as recently as the year 
2000. Transferring the benefits Californians have 
reported for Mono Lake suggests a potential non–
use valuation of the Salton Sea on the order of 
$1.9 billion annually. Depending on the discount 
rate, these annual values translate into present 
values ranging from $10 billion to $26 billion 
through 2047.
Conclusion
The high costs of the California Natural Resources 
Agency’s proposed ‘preferred alternative’ 
have inhibited deliberation and deterred any 
meaningful investment in the revitalization of 
the Salton Sea. The assumption seems to be that 
delaying action at the Salton Sea will result in 
business as usual, with no additional costs. This is 
clearly not the case. Because the Salton Sea has 
changed over the past decade and will soon enter 
a period of very rapid deterioration, the costs of 
inaction are escalating rapidly. When a project 
is implemented dramatically affects the inaction 
costs estimated above. Postponing decisions and 
actions for the Salton Sea imposes significant 
costs on the people and property owners in the 
region, and lesser costs on Californians generally.
Figure ES–1 compares the project costs of the 
state’s proposed revitalization alternative and of 
its conceptual mitigation plan with the estimated 
inaction costs for public health and non–use 
benefits, and with the one–time estimated 
devaluation of property in the region, through 
the year 2047. In the figure, the higher estimated 
inaction costs appear in red, while the lower 
estimates appear in orange. These estimated 
costs provide an initial basis for comparison with 
the estimated project costs of revitalization or 
mitigation, shown in black, to demonstrate that 
the costs of inaction are not zero. Even at the 
low estimate, the long–term social and economic 
costs of a deteriorating Salton Sea could approach 
$29 billion, well in excess of the project cost 
of the state’s revitalization plan. A more robust 
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comparison would require additional information 
about the total economic costs and benefits of 
the revitalization and mitigation projects. 
Figure ES–1 indicates that the costs of inaction 
greatly exceed the costs of action at the Salton 
Sea, strongly suggesting that action at the 
Salton Sea should be funded and implemented 
quickly. However, not all ‘actions’ would avoid 
the ‘inaction’ costs: a mitigation plan designed 
only to control dust emissions would not 
improve recreation in the region, nor would it 
improve property values or promote economic 
development; such a plan would do little to 
improve declining ecological values. A project 
that both controls dust and creates habitat 
could limit or avoid public health costs, reduce 
or eliminate impacts to property values, and 
maintain or even enhance ecological values. A 
more comprehensive revitalization plan should 
also be evaluated within this broader context of 
created benefits and avoided costs. In all cases, 
delaying action imposes real costs.
The consequences of continued inaction at 
the Salton Sea will be felt most directly by 
the 650,000 people who live in harm’s way of 
the Salton Sea’s dust, as well as by the birds 
and other life that depend on the lake. These 
consequences generate real costs. These 
considerable costs, estimated for the first time 
by this report, demonstrate the urgent need for 
action at the Salton Sea.
Figure ES–1. Present values of estimated costs of Salton Sea action and inaction, through 2047.
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The Salton Sea, located in remote, southeastern 
California, stretches nearly 35 miles between the 
lower Coachella Valley in Riverside County and 
the Imperial Valley in Imperial County (Figure 1), 
in a region that has experienced rapid population 
growth. California’s largest lake, with a current 
surface area of about 350 square miles, the 
Salton Sea is also very shallow. As the Salton 
Sea shrinks due to declining inflows, it exposes 
large expanses of lakebed, some of which will 
emit dust. This dust will contribute to poor air 
quality in a basin that already fails to meet 
state and federal air quality standards. The 
lake, reliant on agricultural runoff, lies more 
than 230 feet below sea 
level in one of the hottest 
deserts in the country. 
Lacking any outlet 
except evaporation and 
suffering from declining 
inflows, the Salton 
Sea grows ever saltier 
and less hospitable. 
Its increasingly salty, 
oxygen–starved waters – 
previously home to one 
of the most productive 
fisheries in the world – have lost all but the 
hardiest, most resilient fish. Declining numbers 
of fish and invertebrates mean a smaller food 
base for the hundreds of thousands of resident 
and migratory birds that depend on the lake.
The lake has a rich and storied history, replete 
with glamorous celebrities and international 
speedboat races. But the Salton Sea has fallen on 
hard times in the past several decades, its waters 
rising in the early 1970s to flood marinas and 
hotels, then receding in the past decade to strand 
shoreline properties. The hundreds of thousands 
of visitors who once flocked to its shores have 
moved on. The hotels and marinas and stores that 
once prospered along the Sea’s shoreline have 
long since shut their doors.
The Salton Sea’s future looks even more grim. 
The lake faces catastrophic change, driven 
most immediately by a massive water transfer 
between Imperial Valley and San Diego County 
and a subsequent reduction in flows to the Salton 
1. Introduction
Figure 1. California’s Salton Sea.
Source: California Department of Water Resources.
Hazard’s Toll: The Costs of Inaction at the Salton Sea  I  2
Sea, as well as by declining inflows from Mexico, 
increasing urbanization, changing agricultural 
practices, and a hotter and drier climate (CNRA 
2006). In the next fifteen years, the volume of 
water flowing into the lake will decrease by about 
40%, the Salton Sea’s surface will drop by twenty 
feet and its volume will decrease by more than 
60%. Salinity will triple. One hundred square 
miles of lakebed will be exposed to the region’s 
blowing winds, increasing dust emissions (Cohen 
and Hyun 2006).
The magnitude of these changes has been known 
for many years. There have been scores of 
studies and plans and proposals and suggestions 
for revitalizing the Salton Sea, many 
meetings and millions of dollars spent 
in pursuit of solutions. In 2007, the 
California Natural Resources Agency 
submitted a preferred Salton Sea 
Restoration Plan (CNRA 2007) to the 
state legislature that carried a $10 
billion cost estimate (adjusted to 
2013$1), plus annual operation and 
maintenance costs of about $150 
million once fully constructed. Other 
proposals, such as pumping in millions 
of acre–feet of ocean water from the 
Gulf of California, have also been 
suggested, but they would be even more 
expensive, take longer to construct, 
and would require the negotiation of a 
new international treaty. The massive 
scale of the Salton Sea means that a bare–bones 
mitigation effort, simply to offset the direct 
impacts of the Imperial Valley–San Diego water 
transfer, could cost almost a billion dollars in 
capital expenditures alone, plus $56 million 
annually for operations and maintenance. The 
magnitude of these costs and the scale of the 
problem, as well as the absence of a consensus 
solution, have discouraged state and federal 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar values referenced in 
this report have been adjusted to 2013$, using the Consumer 
Price Index, calculated at http://www.measuringworth.com/.
legislators from funding Salton Sea revitalization 
efforts and have become a ready excuse for 
postponing meaningful action at the Salton Sea.
Figure 2 show the costs estimated for the state’s 
preferred alternative (CNRA 2006); the default 
basis of comparison for these costs has been 
zero, or the presumed cost of not taking any 
action at the Salton Sea. To date, the California 
legislature has not taken any action on the 
Resources Agency’s 2007 preferred alternative, 
so the planning and construction underlying the 
cost projections shown below would be shifted by 
at least seven years. That is, costs projected for 
2008–13 would be incurred in 2015–20 or later.
Although future Salton Sea conditions have been 
projected (Cohen and Hyun 2006, CNRA 2006), 
the economic costs associated with increased 
dust emissions due to additional lakebed exposure 
and diminished property values due to real and 
perceived problems at the lake previously had 
not been estimated. To date, decision–makers 
have had to decide between the very high costs 
of Salton Sea restoration, the lower but still 
significant costs of mitigation, and the perception 
that deferring Salton Sea–related decisions 
and actions will not result in any measurable, 
additional costs. This report offers the first 
Figure 2. Projected costs of state’s preferred 
alternative, 2008–2047.
Source: CNRA 2007.
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estimates of the many local and regional costs 
associated with deferring meaningful action at 
the Salton Sea. 
This discrepancy between the stated costs of 
action at the Salton Sea and the unstated and 
frequently ignored costs of inaction underscores 
one of the greatest hurdles confronting the Sea: 
its future condition will be dramatically worse 
than its current condition, significantly increasing 
the costs of inaction. The discontinuity between 
recent conditions and fundamentally different 
future conditions challenges efforts to plan 
accordingly (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Milly 
et al. 2008). Although we lack certainty about 
the exact timing and specific, quantified impacts 
arising from a future Salton Sea, it is clear that 
the deteriorating Salton Sea will adversely affect 
the region, causing real, measurable adverse 
impacts to public and ecological health (IID 2002, 
Cohen and Hyun 2006, CNRA 2006). Despite the 
many warnings about the impending Salton Sea 
catastrophe, little has been done. Unfortunately, 
this reflects a broader trend:  while society 
often responds quickly to existing disasters, we 
frequently fail to act to avert predicted future 
events. California’s inaction with respect to the 
Salton Sea represents another example of failure 
to avoid a known threat.
The future costs of inaction – such as damages 
to public health and to property values – at 
the Salton Sea have been largely unquantified, 
implicitly assigning them a value of zero 
(Schwabe et al. 2008). This implicit zero value 
fosters the belief that failing to take action 
at the Salton Sea will not impose any new or 
additional costs. This report suggests preliminary 
estimates for these future costs of inaction, 
to address this obvious oversight and to offer 
a basis for comparing the costs of an action at 
the Salton Sea with the benefits of that action 
(in this case, both the avoided costs of inaction 
and the direct benefits generated by the project 
itself). The question should be:  does the broader 
societal value generated by building a restoration 
project at the Salton Sea justify the direct cost 
of that project? Justifying this cost requires not 
only an estimate of the benefits generated by 
the restoration project, but also an estimate of 
the additional damages that could arise in the 
absence of the project.2
Yet, to date, there has not been an effort to 
compare the costs of restoring or rehabilitating 
the Salton Sea with the costs of not taking action. 
Because conditions at and around the Salton Sea 
will deteriorate in coming years (Cohen and Hyun 
2006, CNRA 2006), the economic and ecologic 
costs of inaction could be quite significant. These 
costs include:
	 Rising health care costs, due to the 
adverse impact increased dust emissions 
have on human health;
	 Falling regional property values, due to 
real and perceived health threats and 
declining aesthetic value; 
	 Diminished agricultural productivity, due 
to dust emissions and to the loss of the 
Sea’s buffering impacts on temperature 
and humidity in nearby farmland;
	 Declining recreational revenues; and
	 Diminished ecosystem services, including 
impacts to listed species and related non–
market values.
objective
The objective of this report is to estimate the 
costs of “inaction” at the Salton Sea, to provide 
decision–makers and the general public with 
information for deciding on a path forward for 
the Salton Sea.
2 The opportunity costs of Salton Sea projects can be 
construed as avoided damages, or the opposite of a 
conventional foregone benefit of an action. In the case of the 
Salton Sea, not acting imposes additional costs.
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This report is a companion volume to Hazard: 
The Future of the Salton Sea With No 
Restoration Project3 (Cohen and Hyun 2006). 
The previous volume contains information on the 
formation, ecological processes, and hydrology 
of the Salton Sea, as well as an assessment of 
the potential ecological impacts of the Sea’s 
current decline. 
Scope
The scope of this economic assessment includes:
1. Changes in health care costs, given the 
projected increase in dust emissions and 
the link to respiratory problems, in areas 
downwind from the Salton Sea;
2. Changes in property values in the 
immediate vicinity, and in the Coachella 
and Imperial valleys more broadly;
3. Costs associated with impacts on local 
agriculture, from dust and from the loss of 
the Sea’s microclimate; 
4. Changes in recreational revenues; and
5. Changes in non–use values. 
The boundaries of the Salton Sea Air Basin, 
including the Coachella Valley in Riverside 
County and all of Imperial County, constitute 
the geographic scope of this study (see Figure 
3). This study evaluates potential economic 
impacts associated with a declining Salton Sea 
to the year 2047, coinciding with the term of the 
current Imperial Valley–San Diego water transfer 
agreement.4
3 Hazard is available online at http://pacinst.org/
publication/restoration–project–critical–to–salton–seas–
future/. 
4 Many of the public health costs associated with increased 
dust emissions will occur after this study period, so the 
suggested estimates are lower than they would be if they 
reflected the lifetime impacts of exposure to unhealthy 
concentrations of PM10.
The remainder of this introduction describes the 
assumptions, basic methods, and limitations for 
this study. The next chapter briefly describes 
the changing physical conditions at the Salton 
Sea and the institutional context framing 
current and future actions. Chapters 3 through 
7 describe the methods used and the initial 
estimates of the costs of inaction on public 
health, property values, agriculture, recreation, 
and non–use values such as existence and 
preservation values. Chapter 8 summarizes these 
results, while Chapter 9 offers conclusions and 
recommendations.
Assumptions 
This report describes the costs of “no action” 
at the Salton Sea. Estimating these future costs 
requires a number of assumptions about both the 
changing physical conditions at and around the 
Salton Sea and local, state, and federal responses 
to these changes. There have been, and will 
continue to be, some projects implemented at 
the Salton Sea. In this report, “no action” and 
“inaction” mean the absence of a large–scale 
Salton Sea revitalization effort. As described in 
the following, “no action” and “inaction” also 
refer to the potential delays in implementing 
Figure 3. Study area boundaries.
Source: California Air Resources Board.
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an air quality management project of a scale 
sufficient to address the expected dust emissions 
arising from the exposed lakebed. 
The estimates made in this report assume the 
following, described in greater detail in Chapter 
2, The Changing Salton Sea:
1. Changing physical conditions at the Salton 
Sea, including the rate of exposure of 
lakebed and changes in salinity, occur at 
the rates projected by Cohen and Hyun 
(2006) and by the California Natural 
Resources Agency (CNRA 2006);
2. Currently scheduled habitat projects 
at the Salton Sea, including California’s 
Species Conservation Habitat (640 acres), 
the Red Hill Bay project (650 acres), and 
the Torres–Martinez wetlands (105 acres), 
are completed by or before 2017;
3. The state will not assume responsibility 
for funding air quality mitigation at the 
Salton Sea until 2025 (California State 
Auditor 2013), and possibly as late as 
2048, based on interpretations of the 
factors triggering state liability (see 
following discussion); 
4. The Quantification Settlement 
Agreement (QSA) Joint Powers Authority 
(JPA), responsible for implementing 
mitigation projects, may experience 
budget shortfalls prior to 2025 because 
expenditures in some years may exceed 
revenues under the QSA payment 
schedule, potentially delaying the 
implementation of mitigation projects; 
and
5. The QSA JPA, and subsequently the State 
of California, will be directly responsible 
for air quality management of about 58% 
of the Salton Sea playa5 exposed in 2047; 
the remainder will be the responsibility 
of individual land owners. Determining 
responsibility for managing specific 
parcels of land may lead to litigation 
and further delay management efforts, 
increasing dust emissions in the interim. 
Methods
This study estimates the potential economic costs 
of a declining Salton Sea based on published 
projections of future conditions, including water 
quality, elevation, amount of exposed lakebed, 
and the potential volume and frequency of 
dust emissions. The methods used to estimate 
these economic costs include both evaluations 
of the costs that would accrue from the five 
topics listed in the above scope and estimates 
of the costs required to avoid or mitigate these 
impacts, including but not limited to those 
developed by the State of California’s 2007 Salton 
Sea Ecosystem Restoration Program PEIR, the 
QSA JPA, and the state’s Species Conservation 
Habitat. The following chapters include detailed 
discussion of the methods used to estimate costs 
for each topic.
Unless otherwise noted, all costs are reported in 
2013 dollars, adjusted using the Consumer Price 
Index as calculated by www.MeasuringWorth.
com. Future costs are escalated at 2% per year 
to reflect expected increases in the consumer 
price index. That is, if the cost of building an 
air quality management project is estimated to 
cost $100 million in 2014, this study projects that 
it would cost $102 million in 2015. The present 
value of future costs (including capital and O&M 
costs) through 2047 is calculated assuming this 
cost escalation, and then discounted using 4% and 
6% rates.
5 “Playa” refers to exposed or dry lakebed, typically very 
level land lacking vegetation in arid, interior basins.
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limitations
Several factors limit the accuracy and precision of 
the estimates in this report, including:
1. Absence of an inventory of dust–emitting 
Salton Sea playa;
2. Absence of an accepted projection of 
future emissivity;
3. No published relationship between dust 
loadings (in tons/day or equivalent) from 
Salton Sea playa and PM10 concentrations 
(in µg/m3) in the region;
4. No published studies on PM10 
concentrations in the Salton Sea air basin 
and impacts on public health or costs 
related to these impacts;
5. No published studies on the impacts of 
dust or airborne toxic materials on crop 
production or quality in the Coachella or 
Imperial Valleys;
6. Absence of recent regional or state polling 
data on public perceptions of the Salton 
Sea;
7. Incomplete information on the number 
and origins of Salton Sea visitors and their 
local expenditures;
8. Lack of survey data on homebuyers’/
sellers’ expectations about the future 
Salton Sea; 
9. No published studies on the lake’s 
reported micro–climate benefits for local 
crops; and
10. Absence of survey data on local, regional, 
state, and national willingness–to–pay to 
protect and preserve the Salton Sea’s non–
use ecosystem benefits.
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The Salton Sea has changed 
throughout its history. 
The Colorado River broke 
through an unprotected 
diversion structure to form 
the current incarnation of 
the lake in 1905, refilling 
an ancient lakebed that 
had filled and dried many 
times over the past several 
millennia. The lake quickly 
shrank after losing the 
river’s inflows in 1907, 
but began to grow again 
with the expansion of 
irrigated agriculture and 
the designation of the 
lake as a depository for 
agricultural drainage in 
the 1920s. Figure 4 shows 
that the elevation and 
salinity of the Salton Sea 
have changed considerably over the past 110 
years. After the initial flooding, the Sea reached 
its maximum size and elevation in the mid–
1990s, as a result of several factors including 
increased agricultural acreage and more 
intensive irrigation practices in the watershed. 
Water in the Salton Sea lacks any outlet aside 
from evaporation, meaning that salts and other 
constituents washed into the lake tend to 
concentrate over time, as shown in the figure by 
salinity’s rising trend since 1955.
The Salton Sea will change more rapidly in 
the future, as shown in Figure 4. Within five 
to seven years, the lake will no longer sustain 
fish; those currently living in the lake will die 
off, stressed by rapidly increasing salinity, 
decreasing concentrations of dissolved oxygen, 
and increased incidence of parasites and 
disease. The lake’s habitat value for resident and 
migratory birds will rapidly decline, affecting 
hundreds of thousands of birds (Cohen and Hyun 
2006). Over the next fifteen years, the volume 
2. The Changing Salton Sea
0 
40 
80 
120 
160 
200 
240 
280 
-265 
-255 
-245 
-235 
-225 
-215 
-205 
-195 
1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 
S
al
in
ity
 (
g/
L 
TD
S
) 
El
ev
at
io
n 
(f
ee
t,
 N
G
V
D
) 
Elevation 
Proj. Elevation 
Salinity 
Proj. Salinity 
Figure 4. Annual average and projected Salton Sea elevation and 
salinity, 1905–2045.
Sources: USGS, Reclamation, CH2M–Hill.
Hazard’s Toll: The Costs of Inaction at the Salton Sea  I  8
of water flowing into the lake will decrease 
by about 40%, its surface will drop by twenty 
feet, and its volume will decrease by more than 
60%. Salinity will triple. By 2030, the surface 
area of the lake will shrink by about 100 square 
miles, exposing a similar amount of lakebed. By 
2045, as much as 150 square miles of lakebed 
will be exposed to the region’s blowing winds, 
increasing dust emissions in an area already 
suffering from poor air quality. In some areas, 
especially along the southern shoreline, the 
lake will recede as much as five miles from the 
shoreline established in the year 2000. (Cohen 
and Hyun 2006).
Several factors drive these expected changes. 
Key among these is the water conservation and 
transfer agreement signed in October, 2003, 
between the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) and 
the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA). 
Part of the 2003 QSA, the IID–SDCWA water 
transfer reduces the amount of water flowing into 
the Imperial Valley. Through the end of 2017, IID 
offsets the impacts of the transfer on the Salton 
Sea by delivering “mitigation water” directly 
to the lake, according to the schedule shown in 
Appendix A. After 2017, the mitigation water 
deliveries will no longer be legally required and 
the lake will enter a 10–12 year period of rapid 
decline, as shown by the dotted line in Figure 4. 
Other factors also affect the Salton Sea, including 
changing cropping patterns within the Salton 
Sea watershed, hotter and drier conditions that 
increase evaporation from the lake’s surface and 
from agricultural fields, reductions in the volume 
of water flowing in the New River from Mexico, 
and changing land uses.1 
In 2002, the environmental compliance report 
documenting the projected environmental 
impacts of the water transfer identified several 
1 See Chapter 5 of the Resources Agency’s draft environmental 
impact report (CNRA 2006) for a detailed description of the 
hydrologic changes expected to affect the Salton Sea over the 
next several decades.
significant but unavoidable impacts, including the 
degradation of air quality due to the reduction 
of inflows to the Salton Sea and subsequent 
exposure of potentially dust–emitting playa (IID 
2002). That same year, California’s State Water 
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) required 
the implementation of a four–step air quality 
monitoring and mitigation plan, to address 
potential air quality concerns.2 
The Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) 
and related enabling legislation established a 
Joint Powers Authority (JPA) comprised of the 
California Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW), 
the Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD), 
IID, and SDCWA. The QSA JPA “administers the 
funding of environmental mitigation requirements 
related to QSA water transfers” and is currently 
developing an air quality management plan 
for Salton Sea playa exposed due to the QSA 
itself. This plan, still in the early draft stages, 
is developing cost estimates for dust emission 
control measures and related expenditures. 
California’s initial estimate of the costs for dust 
emission control measures and other mitigation 
expenditures was about $920 million in capital 
costs, for construction of a large conveyance 
canal and related infrastructure as well as the 
unit costs for different treatment methods, 
and an additional $56 million per year for O&M 
costs, at full build–out (CNRA 2006). Assuming a 
10–year construction schedule starting in 2015, 
with increasing O&M costs and a 2% annual 
cost escalation to reflect expected inflation, 
suggests that the present value of the state’s 
conceptual mitigation plan would be about $1.4 
billion through 2047, with a 6% discount rate. 
The QSA JPA air quality management plan and 
the state’s mitigation plan are both distinct from 
any full–scale restoration plan. These mitigation 
2 See SWRCB WRO 2002–0013, available at http://www.
swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/
orders/2002/wro2002–13revised.pdf, and WRO 2002–0016, 
available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/board_
decisions/adopted_orders/orders/2002/wro2002–16.pdf. 
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plans seek to offset 
the water transfer’s 
impacts on air quality 
and on listed species 
such as the endangered 
desert pupfish. Neither 
would address the 
full extent of air 
quality degradation 
due to the shrinking 
Salton Sea because 
both assume that 
individual landowners 
will be responsible for 
managing dust emissions 
outside of the elevations 
–233.5’ to –247.5’, 
identified as the 
elevations exposed by 
the water transfer itself 
(CNRA 2006). 
The increasing amount 
of exposed playa and the declining ability 
of the lake to sustain its current abundance 
and diversity of species are the major factors 
contributing to the costs of inaction. Figure 
5 shows actual January 1 elevations (on the 
left axis) of the Salton Sea as a solid line, with 
projected January 1 elevations indicated by a 
dashed line. The figure also shows the amount 
of lakebed (on the right axis) that has been 
exposed (known as “playa”) relative to the 
January 1, 2000, elevation3, in solid bars, and 
projected exposures in stippled bars. Figure 
5 shows that some 15,000 acres of Salton Sea 
playa have already been exposed since January 
1, 2000. It is not known how quickly Salton Sea 
air quality management projects can be funded 
or constructed: the figure shows exposure based 
on an assumption that no action will be taken, 
though it does reflect the construction and land 
3 The January 1, 2000 elevation is within 0.01 foot of the 
average January minimum elevation for the period 1988–
2000.
use of the state’s Species Conservation Habitat, 
the Red Hill Bay project, and the Torres–Martinez 
wetlands, covering a total of 1,395 acres.Sources4
Figure 5 shows a slight increase in elevation in 
2018 relative to the previous year and decrease 
in exposed playa, due to the mitigation water 
delivery requirements (see Appendix A). The slight 
increase in elevation projected for the years 
2046 and 2047 reflects a relative stabilization of 
inflows and a decreasing rate of evaporation due 
to rising salinity. Projected elevations and acres 
of exposure come from CH2M–Hill’s Salton Sea 
Planning Model and do not reflect the range of 
uncertainty inherent in these long–term forecasts.
4 Historic elevations reported by USGS gage 10254005 “Salton 
Sea Nr Westmorland CA.” Elevation–Surface Area conversions 
from Reclamation spreadsheet on file with author. Projected 
elevations from CH2M–Hill model, converted to NGVD 
standard.
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Expected Changes
Three Salton Sea 
habitat projects, 
shown in Figure 
6, are scheduled 
for completion in 
the near future. 
California’s Species 
Conservation Habitat 
(640 acres), the joint 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service/IID Red Hill 
Bay project (650 
acres), and the Torres–
Martinez wetlands 
(105 acres) comprise 
the extent of 
habitat or air quality 
management projects 
currently scheduled 
for construction 
around the Salton Sea 
by 2017. Each of these 
habitat projects has 
plans for subsequent 
expansion, but to date 
none has secured the 
funding necessary 
to grow beyond the 
listed acreages, so this study assumes they will 
cover the planned 1,395 acres. In addition to the 
direct habitat benefits generated by each project, 
they reduce the amount of exposed playa and will 
offer limited amenity values.5
Under various agreements, IID, CVWD, and 
SDCWA assume responsibility for the first $133 
million (2003$) in environmental mitigation 
costs associated with the QSA. Such costs 
5 “Amenity values means those natural or physical qualities 
and characteristics of an area that contribute to people’s 
appreciation of its pleasantness, aesthetic coherence, and 
cultural and recreational attributes.” Source: http://www.
rmaguide.org.nz/rma/introduction/glossary.cfm. 
include, but are not limited to, mitigation for 
air quality impacts. The QSA JPA Creation and 
Funding Agreement6 states that “The State is 
solely responsible for the payment of the costs 
of and liability for Environmental Mitigation 
Requirements in excess of the” $133 million from 
the water agencies. The California State Auditor 
Report (2013, p. 23) notes that “Joint powers 
authority (JPA) officials roughly estimate that 
the local water agencies could exhaust most of 
their environmental mitigation contributions 
6 See QSA Joint Powers Authority Creation and Funding 
Agreement, at http://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/
files/QSA_jpa–funding.pdf. 
Figure 6. Salton Sea habitat projects in 2017.
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under the QSA as early as 2025.” However, the 
payment schedule for the local water agencies’ 
environmental mitigation contributions could 
result in revenue shortfalls, when the actual costs 
of environmental mitigation requirements could 
exceed, on an annual basis, the agencies’ annual 
payments. The QSA JPA funding agreement does 
not specify when state funding responsibility is 
triggered. In the worst case, this ambiguity about 
the start date of state funding responsibility 
and the QSA JPA payment schedule could delay 
implementation of air quality management 
projects at the Salton Sea.
There are at least three distinct conditions 
that could trigger state payments: 1) an annual 
QSA JPA budget shortfall, in which the costs 
of projects in that fiscal year exceed agency 
contributions to date; 2) when cumulative QSA 
JPA environmental mitigation requirements 
are projected to exceed an inflation–adjusted 
$133 million, projected by the California State 
Auditor (2013) to be as early as 2025; or 3) 
after the agencies have contributed their full 
$133 million in inflation–adjusted environmental 
mitigation contributions, currently scheduled to 
end in the year 2047. To date, California has not 
stated when it expects to begin payments, nor 
has the state legislature considered legislation 
authorizing or appropriating such payments. This 
uncertainty regarding the timing of the state’s 
payments, as well as the absence of legislative 
activity on the subject, suggests that full funding 
of an air quality management plan for the Salton 
Sea may be delayed until 2025 or even as late as 
2047, with actual construction of such projects 
occurring even later. 
To date, the local air pollution control districts 
have not finalized regulations regarding the 
control of dust emissions from exposed Salton 
Sea playa. More than 40% of the exposed playa 
will be the responsibility of the individual 
landowners rather than of the QSA JPA, so these 
new regulations will directly affect the volume 
of future dust emissions. The effectiveness and 
timing of landowner control measures will not be 
known for some time. To date, landowners have 
implemented few if any dust control measures 
on the roughly 15,000 acres of playa that have 
already been exposed since the year 2000.
Changes in the Built Environment
The Salton Sea is situated within the Salton Sea 
Air Basin (see figure 3, above) that includes more 
than 500,000 acres of irrigated land and several 
cities, including Calexico, Coachella, El Centro, 
Indio, La Quinta, Palm Springs, and Rancho 
Mirage. The total population of the air basin is 
currently about 650,000, and includes some of 
the fastest growing cities in the state. According 
to county–level projections, the population 
potentially affected by worsening air quality in 
the basin will almost double in the next thirty 
years (Table 1). People living near the Salton 
Sea itself are disproportionately Hispanic and 
poor, raising environmental justice concerns. 
An analysis of the census tracts immediately 
adjacent to the Salton Sea indicates that about 
39,500 people lived within several miles of the 
lake in 2010. About a third of this population lived 
at or below the poverty line, and some 70% lived 
within 200% of the poverty line. More than 80% of 
this population was Hispanic.Basin7
7 Coachella Valley populations beyond 2035 County projection 
estimated at 1% annual growth rate.
Table 1. Current and projected populations in the Salton Sea Air Basin.7
     2013    2015   2020   2035   2045 Source
   Coachella Valley 469,248 488,300 576,161 842,960 931,150 Riverside County Projections
   Imperial County 179,527 192,707 222,920 277,418 311,360 California Dept. of Finance
   Total 648,775 681,012 799,081 1,120,378 1,242,512
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The Salton Sea Air Basin includes all of Imperial 
County, subject to the jurisdiction of the Imperial 
County Air Pollution Control District (ICAPCD), and 
Coachella Valley, subject to the jurisdiction of 
the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
(South Coast). Air quality in the Salton Sea Air 
Basin does not meet state or federal standards 
for particulate matter less than 10 microns in 
diameter (roughly one–seventh the thickness of 
an average human hair), known as PM10. Elevated 
PM10 concentrations are associated with many 
adverse health impacts (CNRA 2011).
Many scientific and medical studies document 
the link between PM10 emissions and a broad 
range of public health impacts. Elevated PM10 
concentrations are associated with a decrease in 
the growth and development of lung function in 
school–aged children (Gauderman et al. 2000) and 
are also associated with an increase in the risk of 
cardiac disease, heart attacks, and mortality in 
adults (Peters et al. 2001). Atkinson et al. (2013) 
report consistent associations of elevated PM10 
concentrations and heart failure, with a stronger 
association in more affluent areas. Norris et al. 
(1999) report that elevated PM10 concentrations 
are associated with increased asthma–related 
emergency room visits by children. Anderson et 
al. (2005) reviewed 95 papers for publication 
bias, finding that even with bias correction, 
a strong positive association exists between 
increasing concentrations of PM10 and incidences 
of daily mortality and with the number of hospital 
admissions for asthma–related symptoms. The 
International Agency for Research on Cancer has 
reported that elevated PM10 concentrations have 
been associated with an increased incidence of 
lung cancer (Straif et al. 2013).
Dominici et al. (2002) found a slightly less than 
1% increase in mortality rate in the City of 
Riverside associated with a 10 unit increase in 
the previous day’s PM10 concentrations, slightly 
higher than the average increase of about 0.5% 
found in their study of 88 cities nationwide. In 
a study in Utah, Pope et al. (1992) report that a 
100 µg/m3 increase in the five–day rolling average 
PM10 concentration was associated with a 16% 
increase in the daily death rate. The maximum 
daily PM10 concentration during their study period 
was 365 µg/m3, less than 40% of the maximum 
concentration reported in the Salton Sea air basin 
in 2013. Zanobetti and Schwartz (2005) found 
that a 10 µg/m3 increase in PM10 concentrations 
was associated with a 0.65% increase in the risk 
of hospitalization for heart attacks among elderly 
populations. These dose–response studies, in the 
context of the Salton Sea Air Basin’s periodic 
instances of elevated PM10 concentrations, 
suggest that increased dust emissions from Salton 
Sea playa would increase the incidence of acute 
and chronic adverse health impacts. 
PM10 poses a threat to public health based on the 
size of the particles themselves, rather than due 
to any specific toxins within the particles. Recent 
3. Air Quality and Public 
Health Impacts
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studies suggest that Salton Sea sediments contain 
some constituents of concern, potentially posing 
additional risks. For example, Sapozhnikova et 
al. (2004) found PCB and DDE concentrations 
at levels of concern, while King et al. (2011) 
identified elements such as antimony, arsenic, 
cadmium, chromium, lead, and selenium in 
Salton Sea sediments. The additional public 
health impacts associated with toxic constituents 
in dust emitted from Salton Sea playa merit 
investigation, but insufficient information 
currently exists to estimate any additional public 
health costs due to the presence of these toxins.
The lake also creates other air quality problems. 
The Salton Sea’s periodic hydrogen sulfide 
emissions exacerbate the public’s negative 
perception of the Sea and present a nuisance, 
and potentially a hazard to human health 
(Lovett 2012). Periodic dust storms, exacerbated 
by exposed Salton Sea playa, can also impair 
visibility. Although hydrogen sulfide and impaired 
visibility create a 
nuisance and may 
impose measurable 
costs on those directly 
affected, this study 
only estimates the 
costs associated 
with increased dust 
emissions.
The Salton Sea air basin 
currently does not 
meet state or federal 
PM10 standards. Figure 
7 shows the estimated 
number of days in which 
the basin exceeded 
California’s 24–hour 
PM10 standard (defined 
as emissions greater 
than 50 micrograms per 
cubic meter (µg/m3)) and the federal 24–hour 
PM10 standard (emissions greater than 150 µg/m
3), 
per year for the years 1989–2012. The figure also 
shows annual maximum 24–hour concentrations, 
along the right axis. The maximum 24–hour value 
reported during this period was 840 µg/m3, in 
2003. The dotted black line in the figure shows 
the trend in the number of days exceeding the 
state standard. The figure clearly shows that 
air quality in the Salton Sea region fails to meet 
state standards in more than half of the years 
shown below. 
Figure 8 shows the locations of the six air quality 
monitoring stations sited around the Salton 
Sea, along with windrose diagrams depicting 
prevailing wind direction and speed on May 22, 
2013. The table in the upper right corner of 
the figure lists wind speed and recorded PM10 
concentrations at these stations.1 The maximum 
average hourly PM10 concentrations at each 
station exceeded the state threshold for PM10 
concentrations; the four stations that reported 
wind speeds in excess of 10 mph that day all 
exceeded the federal threshold as well.
1 CARB’s quality assurance program flagged the maximum 
value reported for Salton City as unreliable; the value shown 
is the maximum value CARB reports as valid.
Figure 7. Number of days of exceedance of daily PM10 state and 
federal standards in the Salton Sea Air Basin.
Source: California Air Resources Board, Annual PM10 Trends Summary.
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Almost 70% of the PM10 
emissions reported for 
the Salton Sea air basin 
arise from fugitive dust,2 
as shown in Figure 9. 
Information about the 
maximum PM10 emissions 
shown in Figures 7 & 8 
come from monitoring 
data, while the values 
shown in Figure 9 are 
estimated by CARB, 
based on existing 
inventories of emissive 
areas and calculated 
emission rates. The 
declining trend in 
the number of days 
exceeding daily PM10 
state standards shown 
in Figure 7 is consistent 
with the general decline 
in the estimated number 
of tons per day of PM10 
emissions shown in 
Figure 9. To date, the 
local air pollution 
control districts 
have not finalized or 
published an inventory 
of emissive areas or 
emission rates for 
Salton Sea playa, or from undeveloped areas in 
the basin generally. As the Salton Sea continues 
to shrink, dust emitted from exposed playa could 
reverse the recent trend of declining emissions. 
This additional dust may prevent the two local 
air districts from attaining state and federal air 
2 CARB defines ‘fugitive dust’ as “Dust particles that are 
introduced into the air through certain activities such as 
soil cultivation, or vehicles operating on open fields or dirt 
roadways. This is a subset of fugitive emissions,” defined 
as “Emissions not caught by a capture system; which are 
often due to equipment leaks, evaporative processes and 
windblown disturbances.” Source: http://www.arb.ca.gov/
html/gloss.htm#F. 
quality standards, which could lead to additional 
dust control requirements. Such dust control 
measures could inhibit other economic activity, 
such as construction and agriculture, with 
broader impacts on the regional economy. 
Future Air Quality in the 
Salton Sea air Basin
Estimating future air quality in the Salton Sea Air 
Basin requires a detailed inventory of potentially 
emissive sites, projected emission rates for these 
different areas, and control measures available 
Figure 8. Salton Sea air quality monitoring stations and May 22, 2013 data.
Image courtesy of IID; data from CARB AQMIS2 and IID. 
Salton Sea Daily View:
2013–05–22 Wind Rose
  Avg. WS Max. WS Avg. PM10 Max. PM10
Abbrev. Site (mph) (mph) (ug/m3) (ug/m3)
TM Torres–Martinez 6.9 14.3 30.1 116.9
SSP Salton Sea Park  7.6 15.2 29.9 84.7
SC Salton City 17.7 33.8 850.0 868.3
BB Bombay Beach 14.3 30.2 49.8 180.3
NTS Naval Test Site 15.9 24.6 111.8 505.1
SB Sonny Bono 13.9 25.5 79.3 340.3
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to manage potential dust emissions. Determining 
the contribution of these additional dust loadings 
to measurable PM10 concentrations in the air 
requires sophisticated models accounting for 
wind speed and direction, ambient conditions, 
and other factors. Determining the public health 
impacts of these projected increases in PM10 
concentrations then requires an assessment of 
exposure rates and duration and the numbers 
of potentially affected people. Unfortunately, 
as discussed in the following, key information 
about each of these relationships is insufficient 
or absent.
The amount of dust that will be emitted from 
Salton Sea playa in coming years is not known, 
but is a “potentially significant, unavoidable 
impact” of the water transfer (IID 2002). The PEIR 
(CNRA 2006) states:
Defining the future air quality in the 
Salton Sea Air Basin under the No Action 
Alternative is an inherently challenging 
task. There are several major variables 
at play, each with varying degrees of 
uncertainty. These variables include future 
population growth in the region, the extent 
of various emissions sources, emissivity of 
each source, and the success of the local 
jurisdictions and others in implementing 
effective air emissions control measures 
over the coming decades. Pollutant 
transport from Mexico also influences air 
quality compliance in the region.
The local air pollution control district is expected 
to publish an inventory of dust emissions from 
exposed playa within the coming year, but to 
date such an inventory is not available. Projected 
emissions come from two previous studies. 
Calculations detailed in Attachment E3 of the 
Draft PEIR (CNRA 2006) project that No Action 
conditions at the Salton Sea would result in 0.071 
tons of PM10 emissions per acre from exposed 
playa each year on average, or less than a half 
a pound of fugitive dust per acre per day. King 
et al. (2011), using on–site wind tests 
at controlled speeds intended to 
mimic existing wind velocities, report 
a considerable range of measured 
emission rates, dependent on soil 
type, humidity and temperature, and 
strongly correlated with the shear 
velocity of the heavier particles (such 
as sand) that dislodge PM10 particles. 
Their results show that a shear velocity 
of 0.7 meters/second, equivalent 
to that produced by short–term (10 
minute) sustained winds in the region, 
could generate on the order of 30 
pounds of dust per acre per hour. 
Extrapolating from these limited, controlled 
measurements suggests that Salton Sea playa 
could emit about 800 pounds of dust per acre per 
year, on average. This estimate is almost six times 
greater than the annual average projected by the 
2006 PEIR.
A related question is how much of the exposed 
playa will actually be emissive, and for how 
long. King et al. (2011, p. 78) conclude that “The 
Salton Sea salt–based crusts near the shoreline 
appeared to be significant but temporary sources 
of dust, limited to cool, wet months, whereas 
silt/clay crusted sites and dry washes (not only 
limited to playa–like environments) appeared 
to be significant sources of dust throughout the 
year.” On–going monitoring efforts around the 
Figure 9. Total tons of PM10 emissions per day in the Salton 
Sea Air Basin, by emissions source.
Source: CARB.
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Salton Sea will improve our understanding of 
the timing and magnitude of dust storms. Initial 
estimates (Cohen and Hyun 2006) assumed that 
40% of exposed playa would be emissive. The 
state’s PEIR (CNRA 2006) assumed that all exposed 
lakebed, including those lands not exposed due to 
the QSA, would have air quality control measures 
but that such measures would be slightly less 
than 100% effective, leading to very limited dust 
emissions. Newer planning efforts, such as the 
QSA JPA’s on–going development of an air quality 
management plan and the Imperial County Air 
Pollution Control District’s forthcoming PM10 state 
implementation plan, reportedly assume that 
90–100% of exposed lakebed will be emissive and 
will require control measures.
Figure 10. Dust blowing from Red Hill Bay 
playa past Garst Road, January 13, 2010.
Photograph courtesy of FWS/Chris Schoneman.
Despite the well–documented associations of PM10 
with adverse health impacts, only two studies 
that estimate the economic impact of PM10 
emissions were found in an extensive literature 
search and a brief survey of air quality experts. 
Brajer et al. (1991) estimated the annual benefits 
of meeting ozone and PM10 air quality standards 
in the South Coast Air Basin (including the 
greater Los Angeles metropolitan area inland to 
parts of Riverside and San Bernardino counties) 
ranged from about $8.9 to $38.7 billion, primarily 
in the form of averted mortality associated 
with lower PM10 concentrations. More recently, 
Mohamed and El Bassouni (2007) estimated the 
total health–related costs associated with PM10 
emissions at about $61/kg, equivalent to about 
$55,000/ton, based on the chronic (85%) and 
acute (15%) effects of direct exposure to PM10 on 
life expectancy. These two studies approached 
the impacts of PM10 on public health differently. 
The earlier study estimated the public health 
costs when daily PM10 concentration exceed the 
federal threshold in a specific populated region, 
while the later study assigned an estimated 
average cost per unit of PM10, without respect 
to the density of affected populations, increases 
in PM10 concentrations, or local health–care 
costs. The Mohamed and El Bassouni (2007) study 
embedded several key steps in estimating the 
relationship between dust emissions and public 
health costs, and should be taken as suggestive 
at best. Given the absence of clear emissions 
data and the lack of a clear relationship between 
emissions and PM10 concentrations, and the need 
for some general estimates of the potential 
public health costs associated with a shrinking 
Salton Sea, Brajer et al. (1991) and Mohamed and 
El Bassouni (2007) offered some general guidance 
on estimating future costs associated with PM10 
emissions from Salton Sea playa.
In the study period of 1984–86, Brajer et al. 
(1991) estimated that PM10 concentrations 
in excess of federal standards increased the 
risk of death of the average South Coast air 
basin resident by about 1 in 10,000, almost 
double the risk of dying in a car accident in 
any given year. The authors noted that the 
small, increased risk of premature death 
applied to the large population in the air basin 
and actuarial estimates of the value ascribed 
to these premature deaths generated a best 
estimate of $6.4 billion (1990$) for a total 
population of about 13 million, with a reported 
ten million exposures. This suggests that the 
value of attaining federal PM10 standards is 
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equivalent to about $880/person/year, in 2013$. 
Assuming approximately 650,000 people in the 
Salton Sea air basin (not including Mexico) and 
using the same value per death estimate as in 
Brajer et al., suggests that meeting federal PM10 
standards in the region would currently be worth 
about $570 million per year, solely accounting 
for avoided premature death. Brajer et al. 
(1991) report that the cost of premature death 
represented a disproportionate percentage of the 
total economic costs associated with elevated 
PM10 concentrations. This estimate is a direct 
function of population; projected population 
growth in the basin would increase these costs 
proportionately. As shown in Table 1, the total 
U.S. population in the air basin is expected to 
increase by 90% by the year 2045.
Several caveats apply to the suggestion that 
estimated annual cost of $570 million is an 
appropriate value to apply to the air quality 
costs associated with a no–action Salton Sea. 
The first is that Brajer et al. (1991) report their 
estimate as a threshold value; since the Salton 
Sea air basin is already not in attainment of 
federal PM10 standards, it is not clear to what 
extent the additional emissions from Salton Sea 
playa can be captured by this threshold value. 
Second, the estimate itself is based on research 
from more than twenty years ago and may 
no longer reflect current actuarial estimates. 
Nonetheless, the study suggests that even 
limited exposure to PM10 can impose substantial 
costs when spread over a large population. Third, 
the baseline health of the South Coast air basin 
may be greater than that of the Salton Sea air 
basin, meaning that the people affected by 
poor air quality in South Coast may have greater 
resilience, while those in the Salton Sea air basin 
may suffer from greater vulnerability, increasing 
marginal damages. On the other hand, average 
income is greater in South Coast, so income–
related impacts would be lower in the Salton Sea 
Air Basin (Schwabe, pers. comm.) 
As noted above, estimates vary on the amount 
of dust that may be emitted by exposed Salton 
Sea lakebed. Assuming the maximum value of 
about 800 pounds of dust per acre per year, 
and additionally assuming that 100% of the 
maximum exposure of about 96,000 acres of 
playa is emissive, suggests that the lakebed 
could emit as much as 100 tons of dust per day. 
This amount is about half of the total fugitive 
dust emissions reported for the basin as a whole 
in the year 2000 (see Figure 9). Maximum daily 
emissions, governed by ambient conditions and 
windspeed, could be significantly greater. On 
the other hand, the state’s PEIR (CNRA 2006), 
using different methods, estimated that average 
emissions without management controls would be 
about 14 tons day. These coarse annual estimates 
do not lend themselves to specific projections 
about maximum potential concentrations or peak 
emission rates, but they do offer an initial basis 
for suggesting the magnitude of the economic 
impacts of dust emissions on public health. Figure 
11 depicts the estimated amount of dust emitted 
per year, based on these two per–acre estimates 
and the amount of playa exposed relative to 
January 1, 2000.
Based on Mohamed and El Bassouni’s (2007) 
inflation–adjusted estimate of about $55,000 of 
total health care costs per ton of PM10 and the 
high dust emission estimate suggests that the 
total public health–related costs associated with 
dust emissions from Salton Sea playa could rise 
from about $360 million in 2014 to $1,400 million 
in 2025, to about $2,000 million per year after 
2035, assuming no revitalization or air quality 
mitigation plan is in place. Completion of a 
functional air quality management plan would 
reduce the amount of fugitive dust emitted 
from Salton Sea playa and would dramatically 
reduce associated health care costs.3 With the 
3 The scale, timing, and effectiveness of any air quality 
management plan for the Salton Sea are not known. The 
QSA JPA is currently developing such a plan, elements of 
which may be operational as soon as 2017, at a limited 
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scale. However, several factors may delay implementation 
of the QSA JPA air quality management plan, including a 
mismatch between the QSA parties’ scheduled payments 
and the expenditures required for plan implementation. The 
state’s conceptual mitigation plan (CNRA 2006) required the 
construction of extensive water delivery infrastructure, to 
convey drainage water to playa around the lake’s perimeter. 
Construction of this infrastructure would be very expensive, 
and well beyond the QSA JPA’s current budget. If required, 
this infrastructure component could significantly delay 
construction of the project and the control of dust from 
exposed playa. As noted previously, the State of California 
has yet to announce when it assumes responsibility for these 
payments. This could be as early as 2025, or as late as 2047. 
Further complicating these estimates is that the QSA JPA 
is not responsible for playa exposed due to factors aside 
from the QSA; by 2047, more than 40% of the land exposed 
will not be the QSA JPA’s responsibility. It is not clear when 
these additional lands will be controlled, or how. In the 
worst case, only very limited amounts of land will have dust 
control by 2047.
low dust emission estimate, public health costs 
would rise from about $47 million in 2014 to $190 
million in 2025, to about $260 million per year 
after 2035. Note that these values do not reflect 
costs associated with pain and suffering, often 
quantified as a willingness to pay to avoid these 
impacts, so total public health costs could be 
higher (Schwabe, pers. comm.). 
The timing and scope of a planned JPA QSA air 
quality management plan directly affect the 
estimates of the present value of public health 
costs associated with dust emissions from Salton 
Sea playa. In the best case scenario, dust control 
measures will be in place on all Salton Sea playa 
by 2016, so that there would be essentially no 
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Figure 11. Estimated tons of dust emitted per year from Salton Sea playa, 2000–2047. 
Based on data from King et al. (2011) and CNRA (2006).
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new public health impacts. In the worst case 
scenario, the state does not accept responsibility 
for QSA mitigation costs until after 2047, the QSA 
JPA is only able to construct minimal dust control 
measures due to limited funding and insufficient 
infrastructure, and playa exposed due to non–
QSA factors is not controlled. Assuming 2000 
acres of QSA JPA dust control measures, plus the 
roughly 1400 acres of habitat projects, means 
that as much as 94,000 acres of playa may still 
be emissive. With the low emissions estimate 
(140 pounds of PM10/acre/year) suggested by 
the PEIR and a 6% discount rate, this yields a 
present value of more than $3.5 billion through 
2047. With the higher  emissions estimate (800 
lbs/acre/year) and a 4% discount rate, the 
present value of inaction through 2047 rises to 
more than $37 billion. Assuming that the QSA 
JPA constructs dust control measures quickly, 
without construction or funding constraints, but 
still assuming that playa exposed due to non–QSA 
factors is not controlled, yields present values 
ranging from about $2.2 billion on the low end 
to almost $23 billion on the high end, using the 
estimates noted above.
Based on Brajer et al.’s (1991) estimated public 
health cost of PM10 non–compliance of $880 per 
person per year and conservatively assuming a 
2% annual increase in such costs, as well as the 
population growth projections shown in Table 1, 
suggests that the present value of the total public 
health costs of continued PM10 non–compliance 
in the Salton Sea Air Basin through the year 2047 
would be about $21 billion at a 4% discount rate, 
or more than $15 billion at a 6% discount rate. 
The extent to which uncontrolled emissions from 
exposed Salton Sea playa will contribute to or 
exacerbate existing non–compliance with state 
and federal PM10 standards is not known and was 
not estimated as part of this study. 
For context, gross hospital revenue in Imperial 
County in 2012 was about a billion dollars, 
and about $12.6 billion in Riverside County as 
a whole. Recall the Mohamed and El Bassouni 
(2007) estimate that about 85% of projected 
health costs would be for chronic rather than 
acute conditions, indicating that most of the 
projected public health costs would not be 
captured by direct hospital revenues. 
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Proximity to water typically increases the value 
of property, especially residential property. 
People tend to characterize water features such 
as lakes, rivers, and the ocean as amenities, 
desirable features contributing aesthetic value 
to the property and adding to the quality of life. 
Higher property values for waterfront property 
or proximity to water reflect this premium. For 
example, Mahan et al. (2000) found that a 1,000 
foot reduction in a home’s distance to open 
water increased the median property value in the 
Portland, Oregon area by more than 1%.
Proximity to the Salton Sea appears to be an 
exception to this general rule. An informal 
review of property values in the area shows little 
correlation with distance to the Sea. Figure 12, 
a screenshot of a Google Earth image of Salton 
Sea Beach, is typical of many of the communities 
around the Salton Sea: houses are not located 
preferentially along the shoreline, and in fact 
many of the lots closest to the shoreline are 
vacant. Housing values in shoreline communities 
are also lower than in more distant communities: 
the median housing prices of currently listed 
4. Property Values
Figure 12. Salton Sea Beach, showing home location relative to the shoreline.
Source: Google maps.
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homes in Salton City is about $55,000, compared 
to about $250,000 for currently listed homes in 
Holtville, a small town about 26 miles southeast 
of the Sea, in Imperial County. Similarly, the 
median housing prices of currently listed homes 
in Mecca, about 3½ miles north of the Salton Sea, 
is about $50,000, compared to about $187,000 
for currently listed homes in Coachella, ten miles 
farther away from the Sea along Highway 111. 
In Indian Wells, about 19 miles northwest of the 
Salton Sea, the median housing price of listed 
homes is about $750,000.
The low housing values of communities directly 
adjacent to the Salton Sea and the relative 
distance of such homes from the shoreline 
itself reflect the lake’s shift from a recreational 
amenity in the 1960s to its current status as 
a disamenity. More than fifteen years ago, 
Bazdarich (1998, p. 12) wrote that “the Sea 
currently is suffering depressed economic 
conditions, due in large part to the afflictions 
of salinity and pollution in its waters and the 
negative reputation this has engendered among 
vacationers and tourists.” Several years later, 
RSG (2003) wrote, “the perception that the Sea 
is dying has significantly depressed surrounding 
property values.” The loss of the Salton Sea as a 
tourist attraction devastated the tourism–based 
economy in the immediate area, closing hotels 
and restaurants and stores and reducing the 
number of jobs in the area. But the disamenity 
value may be even greater adjacent to the Salton 
Sea than in other more remote areas in the 
desert, because of the general perception that 
current conditions are relatively worse than they 
used to be, even if on an absolute basis they may 
still be objectively better than in other, more 
remote areas that have not experienced any 
environmental degradation (cf. Davis 1959).
These depressed economic conditions have 
continued around the Salton Sea and offer an 
indication of future economic conditions under 
continued no action. Regional or state polling 
data on public perceptions of the Salton Sea 
would be informative, but no such polls have 
been conducted in at least a decade. Anecdotally, 
this negative reputation helps explain the 
depressed economic condition of the area 
adjacent to the Salton Sea. If no action is taken 
at the lake, physical and ecological conditions 
will continue to degrade, leading to increased 
dust emissions and widespread fish and bird 
die–offs, further diminishing the lake’s amenity 
value. Dust emissions and the lake’s diminishing 
reputation could have an adverse economic 
impact beyond adjacent areas to other downwind 
communities. Determining the geographic scope 
of these impacts would require new public 
surveys, but two recent data points suggest the 
potential extent of the Salton Sea’s influence. 
On September 9th and 10th, 2012, strong winds 
transported hydrogen sulfide more than 150 miles 
northwest to Los Angeles, prompting hundreds 
of complaints (Lovett 2012). Dust emitted from 
Owens Lake has been detected more than 60 
miles away.
Studies on the economic impacts of 
environmental hazards or disamenities in other 
areas suggest methods for estimating potential 
impacts to property values at the Salton Sea. 
Many studies have attempted to quantify 
the impacts of disamenities such as landfills 
(Brasington and Hite 2005), confined animal 
feeding operations (Isakson and Ecker 2008), 
damaged nuclear power plants (Nelson 1981), 
refineries (Farber 1998), superfund sites (Messer 
et al. 2006), and, at a finer scale, diseased 
trees (Kovacs et al. 2011) on the value of nearby 
properties. 
Boyle and Kiel (2001) reviewed 38 previous 
studies, several of which suggest methods for 
estimating the potential decline in property 
values around the Salton Sea based on analogous 
disamenities. Nelson et al. (1992) found that 
homes located on the boundary of a landfill 
suffered a 12% decline in value, while those 
within one mile of the landfill suffered a 6% 
decline. Reichert al. (1992) found that homes 
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within about a mile of a landfill suffered a 5.5% 
decline in value. Smolen et al. (1992) found that 
there was no impact on prices beyond 5.7 miles 
from a hazardous waste landfill, while for houses 
within 2.6 miles, each additional mile from the 
landfill increased home values by $9,000–14,000. 
Kiel (1995) found that nominal housing sale 
prices increased by nearly $1,900 per mile from 
a proposed superfund site, in the late 1970s. 
Messer et al. (2006) argue that delayed cleanup 
of Superfund sites are associated with long–term 
declines in property values, in one case by an 
average of almost 40% within an 8.5 km radius of 
the site, due to persistent stigma associated with 
the location. Carroll et al. (1996) report that an 
explosion at a rocket fuel plant in 1988 caused 
prices to fall by 17.6% in Henderson, Nevada, 
reflecting the impacts of a catastrophic event 
rather than an on–going nuisance. 
Clark and Nieve (1994) report that petrochemical 
refineries and nuclear plants diminish 
representative household value by about $750 and 
$400 respectively, per facility in a 1000 square 
mile area. Nelson (1981), writing in the aftermath 
of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, found 
no significant impact in property values in the 
months after the accident. Folland and Hough 
(2000), using different methods, found significant 
negative impacts associated with proximity to 
older nuclear plants, an effect that reversed with 
newer plants that apparently were perceived 
as being safer. They found that the older plants 
impacted land values within a sixty mile radius, 
centering at about 10% of land values.
Currie et al. (2013) assess the impacts of 1,600 
openings and closings of industrial plants that 
emit toxic particulates, finding that these 
industrial plants affect property values by about 
1.5% within a one mile radius, and by 2–3% within 
a half mile radius. At a finer scale, Kovacs et al. 
(2011) estimate that diseased oaks on a property 
decrease property values by three to 6%, while a 
broader neighborhood distribution of diseased and 
dying oaks can decrease property values by eight 
to 15% for homes located within a quarter mile of 
infected trees.
Isakson and Ecker (2008) find that, for homes 
within three miles of a confined animal feeding 
operation (CAFO), location relative to prevailing 
wind direction is the most significant factor 
affecting property value (relative to other CAFO 
variables), while for homes beyond three miles, 
the size of the CAFO is the most significant factor. 
They report that homes within two miles of a 
CAFO at an average of 34° from the prevailing 
wind direction suffer a loss in property value of 
almost 17%. An additional mile from the CAFO at 
the same wind angle reduces the loss in property 
value to 3.7%; small reductions in property value 
were found as much as six miles downwind of a 
CAFO.1 
The studies noted above offer a range of 
potential depreciation rates to apply to property 
values in the Salton Sea area. Determining which 
depreciation rate is most applicable requires an 
assessment of the magnitude of the perceived 
risk posed by a deteriorating Salton Sea and the 
degree to which that risk may affect market 
values. The magnitude of that risk includes 
the geographic scope of the impacts (such as 
the dispersion of fugitive dust and hydrogen 
sulfide), the frequency of adverse events, and 
the severity of these events. The reputational 
risk of the Salton Sea may be comparable to that 
of a nuclear plant in terms of familiarity with 
the source of the threat, but the lake’s risk is 
1 The Colorado River Regional Water Quality Control Board 
reports that there are 27 large CAFOs in the Imperial Valley: 
2 dairies and 25 feedlots. While there are no CAFOs in the 
Coachella Valley, as many as 26 illegal toxic dumps operated 
in the lower portion of the valley within the past decade, 
many of them on tribal lands. At least one of these was 
declared a Superfund site. In 2011, the EPA closed another 
landfill, citing complaints from nearby schools about noxious 
odors and health problems. There is also a 47 megawatt 
biomass cogeneration facility in Mecca fueled primarily 
by wood waste products. These and a variety of other 
disamenities contribute to the lower Coachella Valley’s 
overall social and environmental vulnerability (London et al. 
2013).
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far lower in terms of the severity of an adverse 
event. The Salton Sea, like nuclear plants, suffers 
from a very poor reputation, but the Sea does not 
pose the threat of a catastrophic, life–threatening 
event. However, noxious events at the lake, such 
as dust storms and hydrogen sulfide emissions, 
will be common, generating a relatively high–
frequency, low–to–moderate level of impact. This 
suggests that a better surrogate for the Salton 
Sea’s adverse impacts on property values may be 
petrochemical plants or CAFOs, which represent 
more regular, lower–level nuisances, though the 
dispersion of dust suggests that the geographic 
extent of nuclear plants’ estimated impacts on 
property values may be appropriate.2 
The significant uncertainty clouding the 
magnitude of the future risk posed by a no–action 
Salton Sea precludes robust modeling efforts, 
suggesting instead that qualitative, order–of–
magnitude level estimates are more appropriate. 
Additionally, developing a robust hedonic model 
would require conducting a survey of home 
buyers’/sellers’ expectation about future Salton 
Sea conditions and a formal statistical analysis, 
both beyond the scope of this study. Ultimately, 
home buyers’ expectations and perceptions about 
the Salton Sea and its future will determine 
the extent to which the lake impacts property 
values. As the lake continues to degrade under a 
no action scenario, it is likely that its disamenity 
value will increase and the geographic scope of 
this impact will similarly increase. 
The depressed property values adjacent to the 
Salton Sea demonstrate the lake’s current lack 
of amenity value. Bazdarich (1998) reported 
that the value of non–federal, state, or tribal 
property within one–half mile of the current 
Salton Sea shoreline (then at about –228.0’3) was 
2 Dust transport studies from Owens Lake indicate that playa 
emissions from that area can lead to air quality violations 50 
miles downwind.
3 USGS reports elevations for the gaging station USGS 
10254005 SALTON SEA NR WESTMORLAND CA as “Lake or 
reservoir water surface elevation above NGVD 1929, feet.” 
$154.8 million in 1997 ($225 million in 2013$). 
TetraTech (2005) reported the assessed value 
of land within a broader study area (as much as 
four miles from the shoreline) as $327 million in 
fiscal year 2002/2003 ($414 million in 2013$). 
This represents about 0.6% of the total assessed 
property value in Imperial County and the 
Coachella Valley.4 
The incremental impacts of additional Salton Sea 
degradation, such as increased dust emissions and 
decreased recreational and aesthetic amenity 
values, on existing near–shore properties is likely 
diminished because of the decades of cumulative 
impacts generated by a declining Sea, as well 
as the impacts arising from the high foreclosure 
rate in the area. The lower Coachella Valley 
and parts of the Imperial Valley include many 
locally undesirable land uses, such as CAFOs and 
toxic waste dumps, that presumably depress 
nearby property values. A deteriorating, no–
action Salton Sea will exist within this broader 
context of depressed property values and 
environmental vulnerabilities, exacerbating 
already poor conditions but presumably not 
depressing property values as much as it would 
if these other disamenities did not exist. The 
previous section notes that the area affected by 
future dust storms will extend beyond the lower 
Coachella Valley and Imperial County, potentially 
affecting areas thirty or more miles downwind 
via increased dust emissions and the perception 
of additional adverse impacts. Figure 13 shows 
the distance of various communities from the 
Salton Sea, as well as the locations of existing 
CAFOs and other locally undesirable land uses, as 
context for the following discussion.
NGVD is the “National Geodetic Vertical Datum,” which USGS 
defines as: “As corrected in 1929, a vertical control measure 
used as a reference for establishing varying elevations.” 
4 Although some economists prefer to use actual transaction 
values rather than assessed property values, the latter are 
publicly available and also form the basis for tax revenues for 
a variety of taxing jurisdictions, so assessed property values 
are used in this report.
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Figure 13. Distances from the Salton Sea –228’ shoreline, with locations of existing disamenities.
Figure 14 shows the assessed value of property 
in Imperial County as a whole and of property 
within the Coachella Valley, in constant 2013$. 
Imperial County total assessed property value 
declined from a maximum of $11.7 billion in FY 
2007/08 to $10.1 billion in the past two years, 
while Coachella Valley assessed property values 
fell from a high of about $79 billion in FY 2008/09 
to about $63 billion in the most recent fiscal 
year, a decline of more than 20%. These changing 
values reflect the impacts of the recent recession 
and macroeconomic factors in the national and 
regional real estate economies; they are not 
intended to suggest that the deterioration of 
the Salton Sea caused the post–2008 decline in 
Coachella Valley property values.
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A no–action Salton Sea could 
exacerbate two factors reducing 
local property values: 1) dust 
emissions and the threat to 
public health, and 2) the stigma 
(Roddewig 1996, Messer et al. 
2006) associated with a ‘dying’ 
lake.5 In the absence of public 
survey data, anecdotal reports of 
the Salton Sea’s stigma suggest 
that concerns about the lake’s 
smell and recurrent fish and 
bird die–offs could depress local 
property values. As described 
in the previous section, the 
magnitude and duration of dust 
emissions arising directly from 
exposed playa are not well 
defined and are further clouded by uncertainties 
about the timing and investment of the State 
of California and other responsible parties in 
mitigation efforts. The geographic scope of the 
potentially affected area is also not well defined, 
but can be estimated based on studies of other 
regions. Dust transport studies from Owens Lake 
indicate that playa emissions from that area can 
lead to air quality violations 50 miles downwind.6 
If we assume this bounds a worst–case scenario 
for the Salton Sea, dust from Salton Sea playa 
could affect all of the Coachella Valley (470,000 
people), all of the Imperial Valley (175,000 
people), and the city of Mexicali (about one 
million people) in Mexico. 
5 Messer et al. (2006) describe several properties of stigma 
relevant to the Salton Sea: 1) contagion, associated with 
physical contact, such as with dust or hydrogen sulfide; 2) 
permanence, where the stigma does not decrease over time; 
3) insensitive to dose: even non–hazardous concentrations 
of hydrogen sulfide could trigger the stigma response; 4) the 
specific source of concern may be unknown; and 5) fear of 
bodily harm, as is often expressed by people unwilling to 
bathe in the Salton Sea.
6 People more than 100 miles away complained about the 
smell of the Salton Sea’s September 10, 2012 hydrogen sulfide 
eruption, but that one–time event was likely insufficient to 
affect local property values.
As is the case for many existing environmental 
disamenities, the environmental baseline is 
already compromised, suggesting that the 
incremental damage to property values from new 
dust storms is less than it would be in pristine 
conditions. This suggests that the magnitude of 
dust–related impacts should be discounted by 
some value. Table 2 summarizes disamenities’ 
impacts on property values described previously, 
to provide a basis for suggesting potential 
property value decreases due to deteriorating 
Salton Sea conditions under a no action scenario.
Table 2 suggests two general analogs for 
estimating potential property devaluations due 
to continued inaction at the Salton Sea. The 
first is that the lake may be akin to a landfill or 
CAFO, emitting noxious odors on a regular basis 
that adversely affect those living within two to 
three miles of the shoreline, devaluing those 
properties by as much as 17%. The second analog 
is that the future Salton Sea may suffer from 
a broader stigma value akin to a refinery or an 
older nuclear plant, devaluing property over a 
much broader region. Verifying this approach 
would require surveying homebuyers’ and sellers’ 
expectations about the future Salton Sea and the 
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extent to which it would affect purchasing and 
selling decisions.
For the first approach, assuming that dust–
related impacts from the Salton Sea are roughly 
comparable to property devaluations associated 
with CAFOs. At these rates, and assuming 
total adjacent property value as reported by 
Bazdarich (1998) and TetraTech (2005) suggests 
that total devaluation could amount to as 
much as $44 million. However, it is likely that 
existing Salton Sea property values already 
reflect this impact, so the actual impact on 
existing properties may be closer to zero. 
Expected catastrophic decline of the Salton Sea, 
manifested as recurrent fish and bird die–offs 
(see Cohen et al. 1999) and noxious odors, could 
increase the existing devaluation, though these 
impacts may be more directly associated with 
an increased stigma associated with the lake, as 
estimated in the following. 
Using the second approach, assuming that an 
environmentally degraded Salton Sea would 
create a stigma that could adversely affect 
property values at a lower rate but across a 
much broader region, suggests that the impact 
could be much greater. The actual percent 
decrease for property values associated with a 
continued deterioration of the Salton Sea would 
require surveys regarding expected Salton Sea 
conditions, as noted above. Assuming a 10% 
decrease in property values, consistent with the 
rate reported by Folland and Hough (2000) for 
properties within a 60 mile radius of an older 
nuclear facility, could be considered a maximum 
estimate, and very likely overstates the potential 
impact of a declining Salton Sea because the 
lake does not pose a threat of catastrophic 
failure. 10% of the total assessed property value 
in the Coachella Valley and Imperial County in 
2012 would be more than $7 billion. Several golf 
courses and private country clubs in La Quinta lie 
Table 2. Reported impacts on property values, by type of disamenity.
 Disamenity Extent Property Value Impact Source
 Landfill 0–1 mile –12% to –6% Nelson et al. (1992)
 Landfill 2.6 miles –5.5% Reichert al. (1992)
 Landfill >5.7 miles 0 Smolen et al. (1992)
 Landfill <2.6 miles +$9–14,000 per mile Smolen et al. (1992)
 Superfund site  +$1,854 per mile Kiel (1995)
 Superfund site <5.5 miles –14% to –39.5% Messer et al. (2005)
 refinery 1000 sq miles –$750/house per facility Clark and Nieve (1994)
 nuclear plants 1000 sq miles –$400/house per facility Clark and Nieve (1994)
 older nuclear plants 60 mile radius average 10% decrease Folland and Hough (2000)
 toxics–emitting 0.5 mile radius; –2% to –3%;
 industrial plants 1 mile radius –1.5% 
Currie et al. (2013)
 diseased oak trees 0.25 mile –8% to –15% Kovacs et al. (2011)
 CAFO <2 miles –17% Isakson and Ecker (2008)
 CAFO 2–3 miles 3.7% Isakson and Ecker (2008)
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less thirteen miles from the shoreline, suggesting 
that blowing dust and noxious odors could affect 
some high–value properties. Conservatively 
assuming that the real and perceived impacts 
of blowing dust, noxious odors, and the general 
stigma of a deteriorating Salton Sea have limited 
affect beyond the immediate area suggests a 
different calculation. Assuming a 5% decline in 
property value at 2 miles from the shoreline 
and a geometric decrease in the rate of decline 
suggests that total property devaluation due to 
a potential negative stigma associated with the 
deteriorating Salton Sea could be on the order of 
$400 million.
However, if the lake’s stigma and dust emissions 
become prevalent, they could negatively impact 
the Coachella Valley’s prominent golf industry, 
depressing the property value and revenues 
of some or many of the 124 golf courses and 
associated resorts in the valley. Although the 
economic value of this industry has not been 
estimated, California’s golf industry generates 
more than $11 billion annually. Some 16% of 
the state’s golf courses are in the Coachella 
Valley, suggesting that they may generate on 
the order of $1.8 billion annually. These courses 
could suffer disproportionate declines in value 
as the Salton Sea deteriorates, dust storms and 
noxious odors increase, and the attractiveness 
of Coachella Valley golf courses and resorts 
diminish as a result.
Unlike the public health costs estimated in the 
previous chapter, this property value devaluation 
represents a one–time cost, rather than an 
annual cost. Messer et al. (2006) suggest that 
the impacts associated with environmental 
disamenities could persist for many years, 
affecting property tax revenues for the local 
authorities, but these estimated devaluations do 
not reflect annual costs. 
An important caveat is that these estimates arise 
from existing property value assessments. The 
projected 90% population growth by 2045 – much 
of which is expected to occur in unincorporated 
areas closer to the Salton Sea – would increase 
the number of housing units in the area. Although 
the value of this new housing is speculative, it 
does represent an additional baseline against 
which future property devaluations could occur. 
Alternatively, a deteriorating ‘no action’ Salton 
Sea could simply reduce the rate at which housing 
prices increase or, more dramatically, the actual 
and perceived public health threats and stigma 
associated with a no action Salton Sea could 
decrease the rate of population growth in the 
region, imposing additional costs. In this case, the 
no action Salton Sea could cause losses in housing 
development and decreased economic growth. 
These potential impacts to housing and economic 
growth are not estimated here, though they may 
be significant.
Note that these property devaluations are not 
solely dependent on the implementation of air 
quality mitigation projects. Instead, they are also 
contingent on the implementation of large–scale 
revitalization projects, which could minimize 
disamenities or even generate outright amenities. 
As described in the literature review at the start 
of this chapter, these impacts on property values 
could arise from a variety of factors, including 
direct impacts associated with increased dust 
emissions (separate and distinct from direct 
impacts on public health costs) and the broader 
loss or reduction of local amenity values due to 
periodic odors from the lake, as well as from a 
general stigma associated with the lake.
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The Salton Sea lies in the midst of an agricultural 
region that grows a significant percentage of 
the nation’s winter vegetables, as well as large 
amounts of fruits, wheat, and forage crops. 
Enjoying an abundance of sunshine, senior 
water rights, and mild winter temperatures, 
the Imperial and Coachella valleys harvest an 
average of about 500,000 acres and 63,000 
acres of crops each year, respectively. In 2010, 
Imperial Valley agricultural revenues, including 
cattle production, totaled roughly $1,600 
million, while Coachella Valley agricultural 
revenues that year totaled about $620 million. 
The Imperial Valley accounts for almost 90% of 
total harvested acreage in Imperial County, while 
the Coachella Valley accounts for about 30% of 
total harvested acreage in Riverside County. 
Agriculture provides almost a third of all jobs in 
Imperial County, but less than 2% of all jobs in 
Riverside County.
Agriculture is the fundamental driver affecting 
Salton Sea conditions. In 1928, President Coolidge 
designated the Salton Sea as an agricultural 
sump, affording irrigators in the watershed 
the benefit of a gravity–fed drainage reservoir. 
Though naturally a part of the Colorado River 
delta (demonstrated by previous incarnations 
of Lake Cahuilla – see Cohen et al. (1999), the 
current Salton Sea would not exist without 
agricultural drainage. In return, the Sea provides 
two additional benefits to agriculture: 
(1) dust mitigation – the Sea covers 
playa that, when exposed, will likely 
emit dust that may reduce crop 
productivity. The Sea itself also traps 
blowing dust and sand, entraining or 
capturing some of the particles that 
blow across its surface and reducing 
total particulate concentrations in the 
region; and 
(2) micro–climate – the Sea reportedly 
buffers temperature and humidity 
changes in nearby fields, enabling 
farmers to harvest earlier and 
potentially reap a price advantage 
over more distant fields.
Neither of these current benefits has been 
adequately investigated or documented, 
so the values of these benefits cannot be 
clearly estimated. Nonetheless, it is useful to 
discuss these values, both to prompt further 
investigation and to draw attention to the 
potential costs associated with the loss of these 
benefits. Like other externalities arising from 
the decline of the Salton Sea, the loss of these 
current benefits, and the additional impacts 
caused by the decline of the Sea, would have real 
costs that should not be ignored simply because 
they have not been quantified.
As noted previously, no inaction conditions at the 
Sea would dramatically increase the amount of 
5. Impacts on Agriculture
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exposed playa (see Figure 5) and dust emissions 
(Figure 11) in the region, simultaneously 
reducing the Sea’s ability to capture blowing 
dust and sand. A smaller Salton Sea would also 
have less ability to buffer local temperature 
and humidity, a loss that would affect a small 
percentage of total agricultural land in the 
region. These two changes are discussed in the 
following sections.
Dust on Crops
Although there have been a number of published 
studies evaluating the impacts of cement dust on 
crops (Singh and Rao 1981, Chaurasia et al. 2013), 
the number of articles describing the impacts 
of fugitive dust on crop productivity is smaller 
than expected. Armbrust (1986) concluded that 
dust would not pose a major problem to cotton 
production “under normal growing conditions,” 
though this assumed brief episodes of low 
deposition rates (3 days at 1.5 µg/m2), after 
which wind and rain were assumed to remove 
>90% of the accumulated dust. However, Armbrust 
found that higher deposition rates (>28.6 µg/
m2) altered crop physiology and reduced plant 
weight by blocking plant stomata and increasing 
leaf temperature. Farmer (1993), in a review 
article of dust impacts on vegetation, summarizes 
impacts observed in other studies:  increased 
water loss, decreased growth, blocked stomata, 
reduced transpiration, reduced seed set, and 
reduced photosynthesis, noting that the results 
varied depending on the particulate size and 
the specific chemistry of the dust itself. Farmer 
also notes that dust may exacerbate other types 
of stress affecting the plant. However, most of 
the studies that Farmer reviews evaluated dust 
from cement kilns and factories, rather than the 
soil and salt–based sources found at the Salton 
Sea. Although the direct physical impacts of 
similarly–sized particles at the Salton Sea could 
be comparable to those summarized by Farmer, 
the chemical impacts will likely differ.
A local farmer has reported that salt dust from 
Salton Sea playa has damaged sweet corn leaves 
in parcels near the Sea, and that salt dust could 
damage other crops such as lettuce and spinach, 
rendering them unfit for sale (Blake 2007). These 
claims have not been rigorously investigated or 
confirmed, but they offer a basis for estimating 
the magnitude of potential impacts around the 
Salton Sea. Lettuce has been planted extensively 
in the Imperial Valley, suggesting that it could be 
vulnerable to dust impacts and financial losses. 
In 2010, the Imperial Valley harvested more than 
27,000 acres of lettuce, with an adjusted gross 
value of about $250 million (2013$). Fewer acres 
of lettuce were planted in 2012 and prices fell by 
more than 15%, so adjusted gross value declined 
to about $150 million that year. These declines 
presumably reflect broader market conditions 
rather than concerns about potential problems 
from blowing dust.
Actual locations of crops potentially affected by 
salt dust, such as leafy greens, vary year to year 
and in many cases are considered proprietary 
information, challenging efforts to predict how 
much acreage could be affected in any given year. 
Conservatively assuming that salt dust blown off 
of exposed Salton Sea playa and deposited on 
fields downwind were to damage 1% of the total 
harvested lettuce crop sufficiently to render it 
unfit for sale suggests that total lettuce–crop 
related damages could range from $1.5–$2.5 
million annually. However, market prices and 
total planted acreage will have much greater 
impact on total crop–related revenues than will 
occur due to dust–related damage. Presumably, 
growers would shift to other, more marketable 
crops if dust problems became chronic near 
the Sea, so the long–term impacts of salt dust 
deposited on crops may be limited over time. In 
summary, salt–laden dust blowing from exposed 
Salton Sea playa may have significant impacts on 
a limited number of crops grown near the Salton 
Sea, but insufficient information exists to make 
credible estimates of these impacts.
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Micro–Climate Impacts 
The Salton Sea’s large thermal mass and 
evaporative surface tend to buffer temperature 
and humidity changes in nearby fields, generating 
a local micro–climate benefitting local farmers, 
according to anecdotal reports. The Sea’s thermal 
mass warms the surrounding air during the cooler 
winter months, accelerating plant growth in 
nearby fields and allowing farmers to harvest 
earlier, potentially reaping a price advantage over 
more distant fields. In addition to these seasonal 
benefits, air temperatures immediately above the 
Sea’s surface experience less extreme highs and 
lows than do air temperatures above land: air 
blowing over the Sea at night will warm adjacent 
fields relative to those more distant from the 
Sea. Anecdotal reports suggest that crops such as 
cantaloupes and sweet corn planted in fields near 
the Salton Sea are ready for market as much as 
two weeks earlier than those commodities grown 
25 miles away from the Sea (Kalin, pers. comm.). 
During the summer, warmer land temperatures 
relative to the Sea create localized near–shore 
breezes, pulling cooler air from above the Sea to 
reduce temperatures in adjacent fields, reducing 
plant wilt and stress (CNRA 2011). Humidity from 
the Sea combines with the Sea’s ability to buffer 
summer temperature extremes to enable farmers 
downwind of the Sea to bale hay, while farmers 
upwind of the Sea may find their hay crop too dry 
and brittle to bale (Kalin, pers. comm.), providing 
an additional benefit to those farmers downwind 
from the Sea. 
As the Sea shrinks it will lose more than 60% 
of its thermal mass, diminishing its ability to 
warm adjacent air in the winter. Additionally, 
the shrinking Sea will recede from adjacent 
cropland, by as much as five miles from some 
areas along the southern shoreline, further 
diminishing the impact of this buffering effect. 
Although no research has been done to date on 
the geographic extent of the Sea’s micro–climate 
benefits, presumably these benefits will be 
greatly diminished or eliminated entirely under 
no action conditions. The absence of published 
measurements or specific estimates of these 
micro–climate benefits frustrates efforts to 
monetize them. 
In summary, insufficient information exists to 
estimate the potential costs associated with 
either the impacts of blowing dust and salt on 
crop productivity near the Salton Sea nor the 
diminished micro–climate benefits that will occur 
as the lake shrinks. Both of these impacts will 
be felt within a few miles of the Salton Sea, 
so their overall cost may be small relative to 
the magnitude of Imperial and Coachella valley 
agriculture generally, but these impacts could 
be significant at the scale of the individual farm. 
Estimating these impacts requires new research.
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The Salton Sea was a very popular tourist 
destination in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
people visited the Sea for boating, fishing, and 
other recreation. The number of visitor–days at 
California’s Salton Sea State Recreation Area (SS 
SRA), in the northeast portion of the lake, was 
almost 600,000 in fiscal year 1961–62, but then 
steadily declined to about 180,000 visitor–days in 
the early 1970s. These 
declines reflect the 
diminishing popularity 
of the lake as a whole, 
due to its increasing 
salinity and changing 
popular tastes. As 
shown in Figure 15, 
total visitation to the 
state recreation area 
rebounded in the early 
1980s, declining again 
in the early 1990s to 
fewer than 100,000. 
Visitation records are 
not available for the 
mid– to late–1990s. The 
most recent three years 
for which records are 
available, through fiscal 
year 2011–12, show a 
70% decline in visitation 
relative to the long–term 
average. This recent 
decline may reflect 
the impacts of the recession and decreased 
discretionary spending, though it also coincides 
with the accelerating decline of the Salton Sea 
itself and the loss of access to the lake from 
boat ramps. Given previous declines in reported 
visitation, it also may reflect diminishing interest 
in the Salton Sea as a desired destination due to 
real and perceived reductions in amenities.
6. Recreational Revenues
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Figure 15. Number of annual visitor–days and annual park revenue at 
the Salton Sea State Recreation Area (SS SRA), FY 1962–2012.
Sources: California State Parks Archives; California State Parks Annual Statistics 
reports; SSA 1995.
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Figure 15 also shows total direct annual revenues 
reported by the SS SRA for the fiscal years 2001–02 
to 2011–12. The recreation area’s direct average 
annual revenue over this period (in constant 
2013$) was about $118,000, or an average of less 
than one dollar per visitor–day. These values only 
reflect revenue reported by the SS SRA itself and 
do not reflect total visitor spending. Despite the 
dramatic reduction in the number of visitor–days 
in the most recent three–year period, reported 
revenue in the past two years has remained 
above the average for the period as a whole. The 
reason revenues remained relatively high despite 
declining visitation was not determined. The 
cause of the spike in visitor–days and revenues in 
2008/09 is not known.
An economic profile study prepared for the 
Salton Sea Authority (1995) notes that the federal 
wildlife refuge at the southern end of the Salton 
Sea attracted about 31,000 visitors per year for 
the years 1984–1993, while the Imperial Wildlife 
Area Wister Unit attracted about 15,000 visitors 
annually over that same period. It is not known 
how many people may have visited more than one 
of these sites: the number of visitor–days at the 
various sites should not simply be added together. 
The Sonny Bono Salton Sea National Wildlife 
Refuge Complex estimates its current visitation 
rate at about 27,000 people per year over the 
past decade, slightly lower than the 1984–1993 
average, and about 25,000 in 2013. These data 
suggest a slight downward trend in the number 
of visitors to the refuge over the past several 
decades, but much more consistent visitation 
numbers than reported by the state recreation 
area.
The state’s PEIR (CNRA 2006) asserts that 
“On average, visitors to the Salton Sea State 
Recreational Area (SS SRA) spent $92.50 per 
visitor per day,” (about $117/day in 2013$) 
though this appears to be based on a report 
estimating that same expenditure rate for visitors 
to Riverside County generally. SSA (1995) cite 
a 1995 report estimating that bird–watchers at 
the wildlife refuge spent $19 per person per 
day (about $30/day in 2013$). Given that full 
hook–up sites currently cost $30/night at the SS 
SRA headquarters campground, and primitive 
campgrounds at the SS SRA currently cost $10/
night, as well as the direct revenues reported by 
the SS SRA itself, actual daily expenditures by 
Salton Sea visitors are likely closer to $30/person 
than to the $92.50/person reported by the PEIR. 
Inaction conditions at the Salton Sea would 
adversely affect some but not all Salton 
Sea–related recreational uses. Hunters and 
birdwatchers visiting California’s Imperial 
Wildlife Area will likely continue to visit at 
historic rates, since the wildlife area enjoys a 
dedicated water supply and will not be directly 
affected by declining Salton Sea elevations. 
Some camping and day–use will likely continue 
at the SS SRA despite the decline in Salton Sea 
conditions, though the recession of the shoreline 
by half a mile or more will strand existing 
facilities and diminish the appeal of the site. 
Most of the land owned by the National Wildlife 
Refuge is currently under the Salton Sea; much 
of this land will be exposed as the Sea recedes, 
allowing the refuge to expand its operations and 
potentially increasing visitation rates to managed 
areas. However, to date no plans to develop 
these exposed lands have been published. This 
area may also suffer from large dust storms due 
to the amount of playa exposed in the area, 
diminishing visitation rates. In the absence of 
specific projections, this study assumes that 
visitation rates to the refuge will continue to fall 
at recent rates. 
Assuming about $30 in expenditures per person 
per day suggests that visitors to the SS SRA spent 
an average of about $8 million annually (in 2013$) 
during the period from 1961 to 2009, decreasing 
to about $2 million annually in the subsequent 
three years. Assuming that inaction conditions 
at the Salton Sea further diminish the average 
number of visitor–days at the SS SRA by half, to 
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about 37,000 per year – roughly the same number 
reported for the most recent fiscal year – suggests 
that the loss of direct recreational revenues 
would be slightly above $6 million annually 
relative to historic levels, not accounting for 
the loss of revenues due to declining number 
of visitor–days at other locations around the 
Salton Sea. This $6 million per year difference 
suggests an order–of–magnitude level estimate 
of the total decline in total direct recreation–
related expenditures due to real and perceived 
losses of Salton Sea recreational amenities. The 
total present value of this reduced recreational 
revenue through the year 2047, assuming an 
annual cost escalation of 2%, would be about 
$150 million with a 4% discount rate and $110 
million with a 6% discount rate. These values 
are quite small relative to the potential costs 
associated with public health impacts. This coarse 
estimate does not account for income transfers, 
which would require surveys to determine the 
percentage of visitors coming from outside the 
region, versus intra–regional income transfers 
from local visitors spending money at the lake. 
The number of people recreating at the Salton 
Sea has generally declined over the past fifty 
years, for a variety of reasons. The projected 
inaction conditions at the Sea will further this 
decline in visitation and in direct recreation–
related expenditures, resulting in the loss of 
roughly $6 million per year in direct spending 
in the area relative to estimated historic rates. 
In the absence of robust surveys of current and 
historic expenditures, these $110 million – $150 
million present value costs should be taken as 
general, order of magnitude estimates.
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The Salton Sea provides a host of benefits, at a 
variety of scales, including dust prevention and 
interception, recreational and amenity values, 
and micro–climate benefits to nearby farms. As 
described above, many of these benefits can 
be quantified based on market transactions, as 
suggested by the values estimated previously. 
Many other benefits, however, do not readily lend 
themselves to market–based valuations. Examples 
of non–use benefits include the value of a species 
or of a particular habitat. Economists describe 
four general types of non–use values: option 
values (for goods and services that may be used in 
the future); altruistic values (that may be used by 
others in the current generation); bequest value 
(that may be used by future generations); and 
existence value (Schwabe et al. 2008).
7. Non–Use Values
Figure 16. Brown pelicans and terns at the Salton Sea.
Photograph © Jenny E. Ross / www.jennyross.com. 
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The Salton Sea’s ecological importance suggests 
that its non–use values, particularly its bequest 
and existence values, may be considerable. 
This ecological importance has been well 
documented. The Salton Sea and the surrounding 
region support a tremendous diversity and 
abundance of birds (Figure 16), including many 
listed species. The Sea is an important stopover 
on the migratory corridor known as the Pacific 
Flyway, providing feeding, roosting, and loafing 
habitat for hundreds of species of birds often 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands of 
individuals, and also provides breeding habitat for 
several species. Cooper (2004, p. 202) states that 
the Salton Sea “is arguably the most important 
body of water for birds in the interior of 
California.” Jehl and McKernan (2002) estimated 
that more than three million eared grebes were 
at the Salton Sea on one day in 1988. Roughly 
the entire western population of American white 
pelicans was observed at the Sea on one day in 
1998 (Anderson 1999). Table 3, copied from the 
PEIR (CNRA 2006), lists many of the important 
bird species found at the Salton Sea, based on 
abundance or legal status. 
As the Salton Sea’s water quality and surface 
area decline over time due to no action, the 
value of the Sea to migratory and resident birds 
will diminish. The loss of the Sea’s fish and many 
of its macro–invertebrates in the next five to 
seven years will enable certain salt–tolerant 
macro–invertebrates such as brine shrimp and 
brine flies to thrive, offering an abundant food 
source to many bird species, including grebes 
and gulls, but will largely eliminate the value of 
the Sea for many of the species and individual 
birds that currently depend on it. Some of these 
birds may be able to use other habitats, but the 
loss of more than 90% of the wetland habitats 
in California means that many or most of these 
birds will face increased morbidity and mortality 
(Cohen and Hyun 2006, CNRA 2006). 
Estimated Benefits
Many studies estimate the non–use values 
various local and regional ecosystems provide. 
Economists have applied various tools to estimate 
the economic magnitude these non–market 
benefits, often relying on surveys to determine 
Table 3. Focal bird species and criteria.
 SPECIES
 Aechmophorous spp.
(Includes Clark’s and Western Grebes) 
 American Avocet 
 American White Pelican
 Black Skimmer
 Black Tern 
 Black–necked Stilt 
 Brown Pelican 
 California Gull 
 Cattle Egret
CRITERIA
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern Greater than 10,000 birds counted on 
single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; Service Birds of Conservation Concern 
– BCR 33 National Waterbird Conservation Plan (species considered Highly 
Imperiled or of High Concern) 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Federally endangered species State endangered species 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
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 SPECIES
 Double–crested Cormorant 
 Dowitcher spp (Includes Long–billed 
 and Short–billed Dowitchers) 
 Dunlin 
 Eared Grebe 
 Gull–billed Tern 
 Least Bittern 
 Long–billed Curlew 
 Marbled Godwit 
 Ring–billed Gull 
 Ruddy Duck 
 Snowy Egret 
 Snowy Plover 
 Western Sandpiper 
 Whimbrel 
 White–faced Ibis 
CRITERIA
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; Greater than 10,000 birds counted on 
single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan species or subspecies
(4–5 priority score) 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; National Waterbird Conservation Plan 
(species considered Highly Imperiled or of High Concern) Service Birds of 
Conservation Concern – BCR 33 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan 
species or subspecies (4–5 priority score) 
U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan species or subspecies (4–5 priority score) 
Service Birds of Conservation Concern – BCR 33 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
National Waterbird Conservation Plan (species considered Highly Imperiled 
or of High Concern) 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan 
species or subspecies (4–5 priority score); Service Birds of Conservation 
Concern – BCR 33 
Greater than 10,000 birds counted on single survey (Shuford et al., 2002); 
U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan species or subspecies (4–5 priority score) 
U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan species or subspecies (4–5 priority score); 
Service Birds of Conservation Concern – BCR 33 
DFG Bird Species of Special Concern; Greater than 10,000 birds counted on 
single survey (Shuford et al., 2002) 
Notes: DFG = Department of Fish and Game [now known as Department of Fish and Wildlife];  Service = U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service. Source: CNRA 2006 (App. C, Table C–1).
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respondents’ willingness to pay for benefits such 
as the preservation of habitat or protection of a 
species, or the general ‘existence value’ of the 
resource as a whole. Kroeger and Manalo (2007), 
for example, reported that California households 
not visiting the Mojave desert in 2003 claimed 
existence and stewardship values for that area at 
about $170 million (2013$) that year alone. It was 
well beyond the scope and means of this study to 
conduct a new local, regional, or national survey, 
though such a survey would offer a stronger basis 
for estimating such non–market values. 
Instead, this study relies upon the only previous 
effort that sought to estimate the Salton Sea’s 
non–use benefits. Also lacking the resources to 
conduct primary research, K2 Economics (2007) 
estimated the non–market benefits generated by 
the Salton Sea based on a review of 23 previous 
studies on species preservation or habitat values. 
They ultimately focused on two prior studies, 
which used willingness–to–pay surveys to estimate 
similar benefits provided by Mono Lake and by 
wetlands in California’s San Joaquin Valley. K2 
Economics reports the average annual value of 
the San Joaquin Valley wetlands at about $60 
million (2013$) per 1000 acres. The recent USGS/
CDWR Salton Sea Ecosystem Monitoring and 
Assessment Plan reports about 44,000 acres of 
Salton Sea shoreline habitat at lake elevation 
–228’,1 not including another roughly 200,000 
acres of open–water habitat (Case et al. 2013). 
Based on this shoreline habitat acreage and 
further assuming that the non–market benefits 
provided by the Sea are comparable to those 
in the San Joaquin Valley suggests that these 
Salton Sea habitats generate roughly $2.6 billion 
per year in non–market benefits, not including 
the value of open–water and other habitats at 
the lake. K2 Economics cautions that “different 
population & site characteristics” may limit the 
1 Calculated as the one–kilometer band of water closest to 
the shoreline plus the 25–meter band of land surface closest 
to the shoreline. This shoreline stratum has the greatest use 
by birds and fish (Case et al. 2013).
transferability of the estimated San Joaquin 
Valley wetlands benefits to the Salton Sea.
K2 Economics also summarizes several contingent 
valuation studies estimating the value of 
maintaining the surface of Mono Lake at various 
elevations. The most conservative of these 
reported an annual value of $151 per California 
household (in 2013$), or a total of about 
$1.9 billion per year. While there are several 
similarities between the non–market values of 
protecting Mono Lake and protecting the Salton 
Sea, including the preservation of valuable 
migratory bird saline wetland habitats in remote 
parts of the state, Californians’ familiarity with 
and support for Mono Lake exceeds that of the 
Salton Sea. However, the Salton Sea’s surface 
area is roughly five times larger than Mono 
Lake’s, and the Sea currently supports much 
greater species diversity, so arguably the Sea’s 
non–use value is comparable to Mono Lake’s. 
Additionally, San Diego’s diversion of water 
that would otherwise flow into the Salton Sea 
could be characterized as similar to Los Angeles’ 
diversion of water that would otherwise flow into 
Mono Lake, so San Diego residents may feel a 
connection to the Salton Sea.2
The K2 Economics study (2007) strongly cautions 
that the values it reports are merely suggestive 
and should be documented by primary valuation 
studies. In the absence of such studies, and 
more broadly in the absence of general valuation 
studies of the Salton Sea, we are left with the 
general range of $1.9 – $2.6 billion in annual 
non–use values generated by the Salton Sea. 
Presumably, these values would diminish over 
time as the quantity and quality of habitats 
decline. Arbitrarily assuming that the existing 
2 In a reversal of previous opinion, the San Diego Union 
Tribune stated “The Salton Sea … is worth saving.” San 
Diego Union Tribune editorial board, “Saving the Salton 
Sea,” June 21, 2014, available at http://www.utsandiego.
com/news/2014/jun/21/salton–sea–imperial–restoration–
geothermal/.
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habitat values decrease by 15% per year starting 
in 2018 suggests a potential rate of decay for 
these non–use values. Table 4 shows the present 
value of these low and high estimates through 
2047, based on an assumed 2% annual cost 
escalation and 4% and 6% discount rates applied 
to these values over time. For comparison, the 
present value of the “Existence and stewardship 
values of CA households not visiting the Mojave” 
Desert reported by Kroeger and Manalo (2007) 
ranges from $3.2–$4.2 billion.
Table 4. Present value of non–use 
Salton Sea benefits.
    $billions discount rate
Estimate basis    4% 6%
San Joaquin wetlands    $26 $17
Mono Lake    $17 $10
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Southern California’s Salton Sea faces significant, 
perhaps catastrophic changes in the next 
ten to fifteen years, with dramatic changes 
starting in less than five years. These changes, 
driven primarily by the effects of the IID–San 
Diego water transfer as well as by declining 
inflows from Mexico, increasing urbanization, 
changing agricultural practices, and a hotter 
and drier climate, will adversely affect human 
and ecological health in the region. In the next 
fifteen years, the volume of water flowing into 
the lake will decrease by about 40%, the Salton 
Sea’s surface will drop by twenty feet and its 
volume will decrease by more than 60%. Salinity 
will triple. One hundred square miles of lakebed 
will be exposed to the region’s blowing winds, 
increasing dust emissions in an area already 
suffering from poor air quality (Cohen and Hyun 
2006). By 2045, as much as one hundred and 
fifty square miles of lakebed will be exposed 
to the region’s blowing winds, increasing dust 
emissions in an area already suffering from poor 
air quality. The lake’s habitat value for resident 
and migratory birds will rapidly decline, affecting 
hundreds of thousands of birds (Cohen and Hyun 
2006) and further diminishing the lake’s appeal.
Although these changes have been anticipated for 
more than a decade and many plans and projects 
have been discussed in the interim, to date no 
major Salton Sea revitalization project has been 
authorized or implemented. The availability of 
state funding for required mitigation activities is 
also unclear, so much of the dust emitted from 
exposed Salton Sea playa might not be controlled 
for many years. With the exception of three 
relatively small habitat projects scheduled for 
construction next year, no habitat projects are 
currently funded or expected to exist at the 
Salton Sea in the near future. This inaction at 
the Salton Sea, combined with the adverse public 
health and ecological impacts associated with 
the lake’s rapid changes, will have significant 
economic costs.
The California Natural Resources Agency’s 
estimated capital cost for the 2007 preferred 
restoration alternative was about $10 billion 
(adjusted to 2013$), plus annual operation 
and maintenance costs of $150 million once 
fully constructed. Based on the proposed 
construction schedule and assuming a 2% annual 
cost escalation through 2047, this yields a total 
present value of $9.6 billion at a 4% discount 
rate, or $7.4 billion at a 6% discount rate. 
The capital cost of the state’s concept–level 
mitigation plan was almost a billion dollars, 
plus $56 million annually for operations and 
maintenance. Assuming a ten–year construction 
schedule (siting projects as the lake recedes) 
starting in 2015 and escalating O&M costs based 
on expanding project area, yields a total present 
value of about $1.7 billion at a 4% discount rate, 
or $1.4 billion at a 6% discount rate. These values 
represent the costs of ‘action’ at the Salton 
Sea, as described to date. To date, the state 
8. Summary
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legislature has taken no action on either the 
preferred alternative or funding authorization for 
any large–scale mitigation effort. Given this lack 
of attention and the number of years required 
to permit and construct any project at the scale 
of the Salton Sea, continued inaction appears 
certain for at least several more years.
This continued inaction imposes costs on the 
people living in the region and on the ecosystem 
itself. Although future Salton Sea conditions 
have been projected (Cohen and Hyun 2006, 
CNRA 2006), the economic costs associated 
with increased dust emissions due to additional 
lakebed exposure, and the diminished amenity 
and use values due to real and perceived 
problems at the lake, have not previously been 
estimated. Instead, these no action costs have 
implicitly been assigned a value of zero. To date, 
decision–makers have had to decide between 
the very high costs of Salton Sea restoration, 
the lower but still significant costs of mitigation, 
and the perception that deferring Salton Sea–
related decisions and actions will not result in 
any measurable costs. This report offers the first 
estimates of the costs associated with deferring 
meaningful action at the Salton Sea.
The deteriorating Salton Sea will impose the 
following costs:
1. Increased dust emissions, from exposed 
lakebed, will impair public health;
2. Real and perceived threats posed by the 
deteriorating condition of the Salton Sea 
could diminish property values in the 
area;
3. Blowing dust and the loss of the lake’s 
climate–buffering function could decrease 
agricultural productivity and revenue;
4. The decreasing amenity value of the 
Salton Sea will reduce recreational 
revenues; and
5. The changing Salton Sea will provide 
fewer ecosystem services, reducing non–
market benefits.
Estimating the costs of inaction requires a 
number of assumptions, many of them based on 
limited information or on the basis of impacts 
and assessments reported for other locations. In 
some cases, such as the impacts of the changing 
Salton Sea on agricultural productivity, sufficient 
information does not exist to estimate potential 
economic costs, though we presume that these 
costs are greater than zero. An additional 
complicating factor is the growing number of 
people subject to degraded air quality and 
vulnerable to impaired health. As the population 
in the Salton Sea air basin is projected to almost 
double by 2047, many more people – and more 
property – will be vulnerable to the changes 
outlined above, increasing total costs. The 
Salton Sea and the region generally are dynamic, 
increasing the uncertainty about specific impacts.
Extrapolating from existing studies and estimates 
suggests that Salton Sea playa could emit as 
much as 800 pounds of dust per acre per year, on 
average. At a maximum exposure of more than 
96,000 acres, exposed playa could emit more than 
100 tons of dust per day, on average. Converting 
this projected increase into a public health 
impact requires information on the relationship 
between emission rates and concentrations in 
the air itself. This information is not available 
for the region (Zelinka, pers. comm.), meaning 
that it is not possible to model the relationships 
between estimated dust emissions, subsequent 
air quality concentrations, individuals’ exposure 
and dosing, and subsequent health costs. 
Instead, two previous studies suggest a means 
of approximating an estimate: based on the 
estimated per capita cost of exceeding state 
and federal air quality standards, or based on a 
cost per unit of exposed dust. With a worst case 
scenario with the emissions rate noted above 
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and very limited air quality management, the 
latter method yields a present value cost of as 
much as $37 billion through 2047. The threshold 
costs of continuing not to meet state and federal 
air quality standards – exacerbated by expected 
Salton Sea dust emissions and a rapidly growing 
population – generate a present value estimate as 
high as $21 billion.
The potential impacts of a deteriorating Salton 
Sea on property values exists within the context 
of the lake’s existing disamenity value: property 
values generally increase with distance from the 
Sea, unlike typical water features that add value. 
Determining how a deteriorating lake will affect 
future property values requires an assessment 
of homebuyers’ and sellers’ expectations about 
the future lake. In the absence of resources 
to conduct such a survey, this study relies on 
previous research on the impacts of disamenities 
on property values. The existing depressed 
property values near the lake suggest that a 
deteriorating Salton Sea will likely not have any 
additional impact on valuation. But the stigma 
associated with a deteriorating lake could pose a 
risk to properties further removed from the lake, 
suggesting that total property devaluation due 
to the stigma associated with 
the deteriorating Salton Sea 
could be on the order of $400 
million. Dust and noxious odors 
could also depress property 
values and revenues of the 124 
golf courses and resorts in the 
Coachella Valley, so the total 
impact on property values 
could rise to $7 billion.
Insufficient information exists 
to estimate the potential costs 
associated with either the 
impacts of blowing dust and salt 
on crop productivity near the 
Salton Sea or the diminished 
micro–climate benefits that will 
occur as the lake shrinks. Both 
of these impacts will be felt within a few miles 
of the Salton Sea, so their overall cost may be 
small relative to the magnitude of Imperial and 
Coachella valley agriculture generally, but these 
impacts could be significant at the scale of the 
individual farm.
The projected inaction conditions at the Salton 
Sea are expected to continue the recent decline 
in visitation to the lake and in direct recreation–
related expenditures, resulting in the loss of 
roughly $6 million per year in direct spending 
at the Salton Sea State Recreation Area relative 
to estimated historic rates. In the absence 
of records or surveys of current and historic 
expenditures for Salton Sea recreation as a 
whole, this rough estimate can be considered 
very conservative. Assuming a 2% annual 
escalation rate and 4% and 6% discount rates, 
this conservative estimate suggests $110 – $150 
million in foregone recreational expenditures 
through 2047.
The Salton Sea currently provides tens of 
thousands of acres of shoreline and near–shore 
habitats to hundreds of thousands of birds. More 
than 400 species of birds use the Salton Sea, 
Figure 17. Birds at shallow Salton Sea habitat.
Photograph courtesy of Doug Barnum, US Geological Survey.
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including a large number of special status species 
(see Table 3). As the lake deteriorates in coming 
years, the size and quality of its habitats will 
diminish, reducing its value to the resident and 
migratory birds that depend upon it. Through 
contingent valuation surveys and other methods, 
people have expressed a willingness to pay 
to preserve similar values at other locations. 
Previous studies have indicated that Californians 
as a whole have valued wetland habitats at about 
$60,000 per acre, suggesting that the recent 
Salton Sea provided some $2.6 billion annually in 
shoreline habitat value. Transferring the benefits 
Californians have reported for Mono Lake suggests 
a potential non–use valuation of the Salton Sea on 
the order of $1.9 billion annually.
Table 5 summarizes the high and low estimates 
of the costs of inaction. For public health 
impacts due to dust emissions, the year in 
which an air quality management plan becomes 
operational greatly affects the estimated cost, 
as does the estimated amount of emissions. A 
state audit suggests that California may assume 
funding responsibilities for the air quality 
management plan in 2025. Under the worst 
case scenario, such a management plan would 
not be operational before 2048 and individual 
landowners, controlling about 40% of the land 
that will be exposed, do not manage dust 
emitted from their lands. The non–attainment 
costs shown in Table 5 simply reflect estimated 
threshold values for failing to meet state and 
federal air quality standards, providing context 
for the previous two estimates. The property 
value estimates arise from the potential negative 
stigma that may be associated with a future 
Salton Sea; they range from $400 million to 
as high as $7 billion, though these values are 
speculative.
Table 5. Estimated present value of inaction at the Salton Sea through 2047, by impact area.
     ($millions) 
Impact Scenario Emissions Discount  Cost Estimate 
Public health Best case any n/a $0
Public health QSA mitigation low 6% $2,200
Public health Worst case High 4% $37,000
Public health non–attainment  6% $15,000
Public health non–attainment  4% $21,000
Property values high   $7,000
Property values low   $400
Dust on crops    >0
Loss of micro–climate    >0
Recreational revenues   6% $110
Recreational revenues   4% $150
Habitat values San Joaquin  4% $26,000
Preservation/existence values Mono Lake  6% $10,000
   High Estimate $70,000
   Low Estimate $11,000
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Insufficient information exists to estimate the 
potential costs of dust on crops or the loss of the 
Salton Sea’s climate–buffering benefits for nearby 
farms, though anecdotal reports suggest that 
these costs are greater than zero. The present 
values of declining recreational revenues are 
very conservative figures, based solely on recent 
trends at the Salton Sea State Recreation Area; 
general information on visitation to the Salton 
Sea as a whole is not available. The broad range 
of the estimated present value of lost non–use 
benefits reflects the uncertainty regarding the 
value of the Salton Sea to the broader public.
A number of factors affect these suggested 
costs, including the degradation of the Salton 
Sea itself and assumptions about public 
perceptions regarding these changes, but also 
broader regional factors such as population 
growth, affecting the total number of potentially 
vulnerable individuals as well as the total 
amount of affected property. As shown in 
Table 5, estimated public health costs are the 
highest market–based cost associated with a 
declining Salton Sea, while the loss of ecosystem 
services and related bequest and existence 
values suggest that non–use costs could be very 
significant as well.
limitations
As noted previously, the lack of information on a 
number of important factors limits the confidence 
of these cost estimates. Basic information, such 
as the amount of dust emitted from Salton Sea 
playa and the impacts of dust on Imperial Valley 
crops, simply does not exist. We lack important 
survey data on public perceptions of the Salton 
Sea and expectations about its future, data that 
would inform projections of future property 
values in the region and would identify key 
concerns. Information on total visitation rates to 
the Salton Sea area and its value as an economic 
engine for the region do not exist. These factors, 
combined with general uncertainty about 
population growth rates, climate change, and 
changing hydrologic conditions, suggest that the 
above estimates should be considered indicative 
of a general magnitude of potential future costs, 
rather than precise projections.
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To date, the high costs of the California Resources 
Agency’s proposed ‘preferred alternative’ (CNRA 
2007) have inhibited deliberation and deterred 
any meaningful investment in the revitalization 
of the Salton Sea. The underlying assumption 
has been that the value generated by building a 
revitalization project at the Salton Sea would not 
justify the cost of that project. The assumption 
also seems to have been that deferring and 
delaying action at the Salton Sea would result in 
business as usual, with no additional costs. This 
is clearly not the case. Because the Salton Sea 
has changed over the past decade, and will soon 
enter a period of very rapid deterioration, the 
costs of inaction are escalating rapidly. When a 
project is implemented dramatically affects the 
total inaction costs estimated above. Time, then, 
is money in the Salton Sea air basin. Deferring 
decisions about project implementation and 
delaying action impose real costs on the people 
and property owners in the region, and lesser 
costs on Californians generally.
In the absence of a detailed air quality 
mitigation plan, the state’s conceptual plan 
(CNRA 2006) suggests a total cost for mitigation: 
about $1.4 to $1.7 billion, depending on the 
discount rate, assuming implementation starts 
9. Conclusion
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Figure 18. Present values of estimated costs of Salton Sea action and inaction.
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next year. Delaying implementation 
another decade could defer the 
state’s expenditures by shunting 
those costs onto the local 
population, whose health costs 
could rise $1.2 billion or more in 
the interim. Long–term failure to 
implement an effective air quality 
mitigation project at the Salton Sea 
could generate tens of billions of 
dollars of health care costs.
Figure 18 compares the projected 
project costs of the state’s 
proposed preferred alternative 
and its conceptual mitigation plan 
(CNRA 2006, CNRA 2007) with the 
estimated social and economic costs 
of inaction for public health and non–
use benefits, and with the one–time estimated 
devaluation of property in the region. With 
the exception of the property value estimates, 
these costs all reflect a 2% annual escalation 
and a 4% discount rate, to facilitate comparison. 
These inaction costs, all shown in red and 
orange, provide an initial basis for comparison 
with the estimated project costs of restoration 
or mitigation, shown in black. A more robust 
comparison would require additional information 
about the total economic costs and benefits 
of the revitalization and mitigation projects. 
Capturing the non–use values espoused by survey 
respondents would require some method to 
monetize and collect these estimated values. 
Figure 18 indicates that the costs of inaction 
greatly exceed the costs of action at the Salton 
Sea, strongly suggesting that action at the 
Salton Sea should be funded and implemented 
quickly. However, not all ‘actions’ would avoid 
the ‘inaction’ costs: a mitigation plan designed 
only to control dust emissions would not 
improve recreation in the region, nor would it 
improve property values or promote economic 
development; such a plan would do little to 
improve declining ecological values. A project 
that both controls dust and creates habitat 
could limit or avoid public health costs, reduce 
or eliminate impacts to property values, and 
maintain or even enhance ecological values. A 
more comprehensive revitalization plan should 
also be evaluated within this broader context of 
created benefits and avoided costs. In all cases, 
delaying action imposes real costs.
This report also highlights a large number of 
important data gaps that should be addressed in 
the near future. Despite many decades of study 
and the impending decline of the Salton Sea, we 
still lack information on many factors affecting 
life and the economy in the region. 
Bill deBuys (1999, p.23) writes in Salt Dreams, 
“In low places consequences collect.” The 
consequences of continued inaction at the Salton 
Sea will be felt most directly by the 650,000 
people that live in the air basin, as well as by 
the birds and other life that depend on the lake. 
These consequences generate real costs. These 
considerable costs, estimated for the first time 
by this report, demonstrate the urgent need for 
action at the Salton Sea.
Figure 19. Caspian tern at the Salton Sea.
Photograph © Jenny E. Ross / www.jennyross.com.
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appendix a
Quantification Settlement Agreement Delivery Schedule By Conservation Method
All values in thousands of acre–feet      
a  If CVWD declines to acquire these amounts, MWD has an option to acquire them, but acquisition by MWD of conserved 
water in lieu of CVWD during the first 15 years is subject to satisfaction by MWD of certain conditions, including subsequent 
environmental assessment.
b  In addition to the conserved amounts shown on this Table, additional amounts of up to 25,000 acre–feet in 2006, 50,000 
acre–feet in 2009 and 70,000 acre–feet in 2012 could be conserved to meet the Interim Surplus Guidelines (ISG) benchmarks. 
IID has the discretion to select the method of conservation used to make the ISG backfill water. If fallowing is selected to 
conserve water to meet the ISG benchmarks, the total acres of fallowing would be within the amount originally evaluated in 
the EIR/EIS.
c  This assumes that the parties have approved the extension of the 45–year initial term of the IID Water Conservation and 
Transfer Project. Source: Imperial Irrigation District (IID), “Water Conservation and Transfer Project Draft EIR/EIS and Draft 
Habitat Conservation Plan,” 2002.
 QSA Year Calendar Year IID and IID and IID and Total Total Fallowing for Mitigation Total
   SDCWA CVWDa, MWD Delivery Efficiency Delivery Fallowing Fallowing
 1 2003 10 0 0 10 0 10 5 15
 2 2004 20 0 0 20 0 20 10 30
 3 2005 30 0 0 30 0 30 15 45
 4 2006b 40 0 0 40 0 40 20 60
 5 2007 50 0 0 50 0 50 25 75
 6 2008 50 4 0 54 4 50 25 75
 7 2009b 60 8 0 68 8 60 30 90
 8 2010 70 12 0 82 12 70 35 105
 9 2011 80 16 0 96 16 80 40 120
 10 2012b 90 21 0 111 21 90 45 135
 11 2013 100 26 0 126 46 80 70 150
 12 2014 100 31 0 131 71 60 90 150
 13 2015 100 36 0 136 96 40 110 150
 14 2016 100 41 0 141 121 20 130 150
 15 2017 100 45 0 145 145 0 150 150
 16 2018 130 63 0 193 193 0 0 0
 17 2019 160 68 0 228 228 0 0 0
 18 2020 192.5 73 2.5 268 268 0 0 0
 19 2021 205 78 5 288 288 0 0 0
 20 2022 202.5 83 2.5 288 288 0 0 0
 21 2023 200 88 0 288 288 0 0 0
 22 2024 200 93 0 293 293 0 0 0
 23 2025 200 98 0 298 298 0 0 0
 24 2026 200 103 0 303 303 0 0 0
 25 2027 200 103 0 303 303 0 0 0
 26 2028 200 103 0 303 303 0 0 0
 27 to 45 2029 to 2047 200 103 0 303 303 0 0 0
 46 to 75c 2048 to 2077 200 50 0 250 250 0 0 0
